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Abstract
If international atrocity crimes are acts so egregious that their impunity cannot be legally tol-
erated, why don’t we punish States that commit them? The rise of international criminal law is
celebrated as an achievement of the international rule of law, yet its advance effectively may come
at the expense of holding States accountable for their role in mass violence. Transitional justice
has emerged as the dominant normative framework for how the international community responds
to mass violence. Liberalism strongly influences transitional justice, which has produced individ-
ual criminal accountability as the desired form of legal accountability for atrocities. Transitional
justice rejects punishing States for atrocities as illiberal (collective punishment) and illegitimate
(lack of positive law). In fact, transitional justice theorization of justice largely ignores legal ac-
countability for States. Without legal accountability, States enjoy moral and legal impunity for
their crimes. States escape their legal obligations to repair the injury they cause and to institute
reforms that secure a fuller measure of justice and peace. This Article examines how international
law and transitional justice have developed conceptually to effectively prevent legal accountability
for States that commit atrocity crimes, and argues that a new politics of transitional justice is nec-
essary to harness the productive potential of State legal accountability to achieve a fuller measure
of international justice.
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ABSTRACT 
If international atrocity crimes are acts so egregious that their 
impunity cannot be legally tolerated, why don’t we punish States that 
commit them? The rise of international criminal law is celebrated as 
an achievement of the international rule of law, yet its advance 
effectively may come at the expense of holding States accountable for 
their role in mass violence. Transitional justice has emerged as the 
dominant normative framework for how the international community 
responds to mass violence. Liberalism strongly influences transitional 
justice, which has produced individual criminal accountability as the 
desired form of legal accountability for atrocities. Transitional justice 
rejects punishing States for atrocities as illiberal (collective 
punishment) and illegitimate (lack of positive law). In fact, 
transitional justice theorization of justice largely ignores legal 
accountability for States. Without legal accountability, States enjoy 
moral and legal impunity for their crimes. States escape their legal 
obligations to repair the injury they cause and to institute reforms that 
secure a fuller measure of justice and peace. This Article examines 
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how international law and transitional justice have developed 
conceptually to effectively prevent legal accountability for States that 
commit atrocity crimes, and argues that a new politics of transitional 
justice is necessary to harness the productive potential of State legal 
accountability to achieve a fuller measure of international justice. 
 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................... 447 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 449 
I. THE POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
BRANCHES REGULATING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
MASS CRIMES: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ......... 459 
A. International Criminal Law ................................................ 461 
B. State Responsibility and Human Rights ............................. 468 
1. Codification Efforts of State Responsibility ................. 470 
a. Efforts to Define State Responsibility for 
International Crimes ............................................. 470 
b. Differentiation of International Legal 
Responsibility ....................................................... 473 
2. Human Rights Law ....................................................... 476 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ................................................... 481 
A. Transitional Justice: An Overview ..................................... 483 
B. Conceptions of Accountability in Transitional Justice ....... 487 
1. Nuremberg/Absolutist Accountability Model ............... 488 
2. Hybrid Accountability Model ....................................... 491 
3. Grafted Accountability Model ...................................... 496 
C. Implications of Transitional Justice Models of 
Accountability for State Accountability ............................ 501 
1. Human Rights Effaces State Responsibility to the 
International Community ............................................ 502 
2. Human Rights Effaces Remedies for State 
Violations of Duties to the International 
Community ................................................................. 503 
III. TOWARD STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MASS 
VIOLENCE ............................................................................. 505 
A. The Contribution of International Law Scholarship to 
State Accountability for Mass Violence ............................ 507 
2016] TJ AND STATE ACCOUNTABILITY 449 
1. The Normative Contribution of State Responsibility 
to Transitional Justice ................................................. 510 
2. The Remedial Contribution of State Responsibility 
to Transitional Justice ................................................. 512 
3. Evaluation of International Transitional Justice 
Remedies: Law Versus Policy .................................... 514 
4. Location and Enforcement of State Responsibility ....... 515 
B. The Disappearance of State Accountability in UN 
Security Council Referrals ................................................ 517 
1. Finding but Not Acting on State Responsibility ........... 518 
2. The Opportunity of Enforcing State Obligations to 
the International Community ...................................... 519 
3. The Challenge to Enforcing State Obligations to the 
International Community ............................................ 521 
C. Changing the Politics of International Justice .................... 522 
1. Transitional Justice’s Conception of Law and State 
Liability ....................................................................... 523 
2. Overcoming Transitional Justice’s Elision of State 
Legal Accountability ................................................... 526 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 530 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Referring to the violence in Syria, Navi Pillay, then UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, declared: “It’s the Government that 
is mostly responsible for the violations and all these perpetrators 
should be identified and can if there is a referral to the International 
Criminal Court.”1 This logic is as familiar as it is constructed. Ever 
since the Nuremberg trials, the international community has embraced 
individual criminal accountability as a value and goal necessary to 
achieve justice for international atrocity crimes—acts that are now 
recognized as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
                                                                                                             
1.  United Nations, UN/Syria Update, UNIFEED (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.
unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/U140/U140408d/ (last visited May 26, 2015); see also UN 
Rights Chief: Syria Government Abuses ‘Far Outweigh’ Rebels, JURIST: PAPER CHASE (Apr. 
9, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/04/un-rights-chief-syria-government-
abuses-far-outweigh-rebels.php. 
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crimes of aggression.2 Justice punishes wrongdoers, removes bad 
leaders, and aims to stop the bloodshed. Therefore, it is foreseeable 
that as the civilian casualties and death toll mount in the Syrian crisis, 
international consternation will move from hand wringing to 
proposals for intervention. In May 2014, the UN Security Council 
considered a French proposal to refer the situation in Syria to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), who would 
investigate and bring perpetrators to justice.3 Predictably, Russia and 
China vetoed the resolution.4 Also unremarkable was that despite 
acknowledgment that the Syrian State was committing international 
crimes,5 the resolution contained no calls to punish the Syrian State 
for these acts or to impose legal consequences for its involvement in 
atrocities. Such measures might include compensation for the victims; 
the establishment of a truth commission; or more muscular 
interventions like ensuring free elections, redrafting the constitution, 
or reform of state institutions. There is no supranational criminal 
court of justice akin to the ICC, to which the Security Council could 
refer the Syrian State for criminal sanction. In fact, few likely 
considered the absence of international calls for State legal 
accountability remarkable.  
The permanent criminal court stands as the normative pinnacle 
of the international community’s response to mass violence. 
Prosecution by the ICC arguably confers the highest form of 
international opprobrium and demonstrates the commitment of the 
international community to provide justice for the crimes committed. 
The Court stands as a symbol to punish leaders who have orchestrated 
widespread and illegal destruction and functions as an institution to 
normalize accountability for international crimes. Yet we are missing 
                                                                                                             
2.  International atrocity crimes refer to acts prohibited by states and criminalized by 
international treaties or custom for which individuals may be prosecuted by international 
criminal courts or by states that have jurisdiction over alleged wrongdoers. André 
Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes, 8 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313, 332 (2010) [hereinafter Systemic Effects of International 
Responsibility]. These crimes include the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, torture, and terrorism. Id. In this Article, the terms “international atrocity crimes” 
and “mass atrocities” will be used interchangeably. 
3.  UN Security Council, The Situation on the Middle East, U.N. Doc.S/PV.7180, 3/18 
(May 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 348, ¶ 2 U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter 
Proposed Syria S.C. Resolution 348]. 
4. UN Security Council, The Situation on the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180, 4/18 
(May 22, 2014). 
5.  Id. ¶ 1. 
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an important discussion about legal accountability of the sovereign 
State for its perpetration of mass violence. Ironically, as the 
technologies of State violence become increasingly sophisticated and 
brutally lethal (the use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians, 
targeting of civilians and assaults of towns in Libya, aerial bombing 
of villages in the Sudan, etc.), international institutions have narrowed 
their targets of legal responsibility to a handful of individuals. In other 
words, the legal response to atrocities has downsized its unit of 
attention even though the legal and factual basis for State 
accountability persists, if not grows stronger. 
State-sponsored mass violence, such as that in Syria, is a result 
of State policy, also referred to as “system criminality.”6 This means 
that collective structures of the State become the instruments of 
criminal terror and may be most obvious when Syrian armed forces 
are deployed to attack civilians. Less visible when examining specific 
violations, but critical to understanding the involvement of the State 
in such horrors, are the ways in which the State infrastructure is used 
as an instrument to contribute to and enable State policies of mass 
violence. Just as Nazi extermination policies rested on discriminatory 
laws, an authoritarian political structure, an economy geared toward 
war, etc., so too is the Assad regime’s campaign against civilians an 
escalation of the authoritarian State’s response to peaceful demands 
for democratic reforms.7 State policies shape and maintain structural 
inequalities that in turn produce and maintain political, social, and 
economic marginalization, which contribute to conflict.8 
The Allies’ defeat of Germany and Japan made possible the 
imposition of extensive measures of accountability. The terms of 
surrender for both States laid out a series of principles, which 
included democratization, disarmament, justice for war criminals, as 
well as economic reforms and reparations.9 Taken as a whole, these 
                                                                                                             
6.  Andre Nollkaemper, Introduction, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 1 (Andre Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt, eds. 2009) [hereinafter SYSTEM 
CRIMINALITY]. 
7.  Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶ 27-40, U.N. Doc A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 
2011); Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015). 
8.  Pablo de Greiff, Introduction, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: 
MAKING CONNECTIONS, 1 (Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds. 2009). 
9.  Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, 3 
Bevans 1207 [hereinafter Potsdam Protocol], http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade
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initiatives may be understood as a comprehensive approach to 
accountability for the unprecedented scale of destruction and mass 
crimes perpetrated by the two vanquished States. Prosecution of 
individuals for international crimes, while innovative, was only one 
component of accountability. The Allies imposed democratization, 
demilitarization, elimination of armaments industries and reparations 
to prevent Germany and Japan from regenerating politically or 
economically as threats to world peace. These measures aimed 
fundamentally to disrupt and refashion the structural foundations of 
State policies that produced the war to prevent another one. They also 
signaled important normative commitments of the emerging 
international system: unequivocal condemnation and repudiation of 
the German and Japanese State ideologies that championed the war. 
There are two aspects to the international accountability the 
Allies imposed on Germany and Japan that have escaped the current 
international justice discourse: (1) measures that conveyed normative 
culpability of States that perpetrated atrocities and (2) the remedial 
consequences of this judgment. The victors were not content merely 
to have their enemies pay for their losses—the what of the war—but 
they also sought to resolve the underlying factors that produced the 
violence—the how and why of State criminality. Eradicating the 
structural contributors to State criminality was linked to international 
opprobrium of the Nazi regime, of which criminal accountability was 
an extension, not a substitute. In the intervening years, although 
accountability has become the rallying cry for the international justice 
movement, this discourse does not encompass the full measures of 
State legal accountability the Allies imposed, but has focused 
exclusively on individual criminal accountability for such bloodshed. 
There is a value to naming States culpable for their role in mass 
violence which we have lost. Acts which the international community 
recognizes as international crimes—genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes—are elevated as such because of their 
gravity. By their nature, when perpetrated by State actors, these 
crimes are committed in furtherance of State policy. A moral case can 
be made for finding such States legally culpable for such acts. Doing 
so inscribes moral condemnation and repudiation of offending State 
polices. It also lays a legal foundation for appropriate remedies 
                                                                                                             
17.asp. In the case of Germany, the Allies also required the dissolution of all Nazi institutions 
and influences. 
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against the State; remedies that address the what, how, and why of 
State criminality. Without State culpability, we have effective State 
impunity. While perhaps one day Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 
might stand trial in The Hague, there is no mechanism to ensure that 
the Syrian State will fulfill its legal duties to provide reparations to all 
victims, institute democratic reforms, rebalance political power, and 
other undertake other initiatives to address the structural foundations 
of the State that enabled it to slaughter its residents. If part of the 
rationale for individual accountability is that no one should be able to 
commit egregious international harms without consequence, why do 
we tolerate a different standard for States? It is curious that 
international criminal law has assumed the moral apex of 
international condemnation for mass atrocities to the exclusion of 
punishing States for the same conduct. How has this come about and 
what are the consequences of this approach? 
The first and most obvious roadblock to punishing States for 
their role in atrocities is that, despite efforts toward codification, State 
crimes do not exist in international positive law.10 Nevertheless, 
international law does establish legal consequences for State 
perpetration of acts that constitute international crimes through the 
law of state responsibility. The law of state responsibility involves a 
legal determination of a breach of international obligations 
attributable to a State and the legal consequences of such a breach.11 
While States may not as a formal matter “commit crimes,” they may 
be legally responsible for acts for which individuals also may be held 
legally responsible as international crimes. The twin types of legal 
responsibility—individual and State—for the same underlying act is a 
concept referred to as “dual responsibility.”12 This lack of positive 
law for State crimes is not a conceptual roadblock for State 
accountability since international law already establishes principles of 
                                                                                                             
10.  Positive law is a “uniform order of social norms.” Frauke Lachenmann, Legal 
Positivism, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. 
Wolfrum ed., 2011). As an “expression of basic social laws in the development of society,” 
positive law prescribes the conduct of “legal persons.” Alexander Orakhelashvili, Natural Law 
and Justice, THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. 
Wolfrum ed., 2007). 
11.  SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 23; Jutta Brunée, International Legal 
Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L. L. 3, 
21 (2005). 
12.  Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 337. While states 
and individuals may each bear legal responsibility, pursuit of one form of responsibility does 
not automatically trigger pursuit of the other. 
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legal responsibility of States for their breaches. Nevertheless, State 
sovereignty and the absence of a positive law of State crimes pose 
challenges to creating processes of State accountability for system 
criminality. 
State responsibility for acts that are also international crimes is 
an available tool through which international acknowledgment of 
State wrongdoing can be achieved. The lack of codification of State 
crimes is not an insurmountable barrier to establishing a process of 
functional State culpability. As a formal matter, the nature of State 
responsibility is not criminal and therefore the legal inscription of 
culpability cannot attach to State responsibility for acts that are also 
international crimes. Nevertheless, legal formalism will not mask the 
normative judgment that State responsibility will convey. A finding of 
State responsibility for acts that constitute genocide or crimes against 
humanity effectively does the normative work that a formal finding of 
criminal culpability achieves, which may explain, in part, why States 
have not advanced its use. 
The material consequences of State responsibility open the 
possibility to develop a more robust reparations practice. State 
responsibility triggers the duty of the State to repair the injury caused 
by the breach. It is in this area that the Allies’ terms of surrender 
should be understood as examples of the nature and extent of 
measures culpable States should assume as a legal consequence of 
State criminality: democratization, economic restructuring, 
institutional reform, disarmament, etc.13 To prevent recurrence of the 
violence, the structural contributors to state criminality should be 
redressed under the rubric of State reparations. 
The legal tools exist in international law to implement State 
responsibility for international crimes. Yet State responsibility for 
mass violence has not captured the discourse of international justice. 
That pride of place belongs to individual criminal responsibility. 
Birthed with the Nuremberg Principles in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, “anti-impunity” and individual “accountability” for 
atrocity crimes have been the rallying cries of the international justice 
movement. States are called upon to fulfill their duties to execute or 
facilitate individual criminal justice, but the international discourse of 
accountability has not made State culpability for mass violence a 
separate target of legal action. In fact, the discursive use of 
                                                                                                             
13.  See Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9. 
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accountability is somewhat at odds with the law of State 
responsibility and injects a degree of confusion when considering 
State criminality.14 Additionally, Gabriella Blum argues that since the 
interventions by the Allies in Germany and Japan, the trend in 
international law has been to move away from punishing States for 
their bad acts and attributes this to an international preference for 
prevention rather than punishment.15 This Article examines the lack 
of interest in State culpability from a different perspective and argues 
that the elision of State wrongdoing from the conceptualization of 
legal accountability for international crimes helps to explain the 
neglect of State criminality. 
Thus, a second, and less obvious, roadblock to addressing State 
culpability for international crimes is transitional justice. Transitional 
justice is the field that dominates discussions of appropriate responses 
to mass violence. Transitional justice as a field has absorbed the 
normative, liberal,16 premise of the Nuremberg Principles, that 
individual criminal accountability is necessary to condemn individual 
                                                                                                             
14.  Legal responsibility is a narrow concept, while legal accountability is broader and 
refers to the process by which states are determined to be legally responsible for international 
crimes and the consequences they should bear. As noted by Jutta Brunée, there is no fixed 
meaning of “accountability” in international law, but it generally refers broadly to the 
processes of determining whether an actor has met agreed standards of conduct and if there is a 
breach of such standards, the consequences that the responsible party should bear. Brunée, 
supra note 10, at 21-22, 24. For purposes of this discussion, the term “international legal 
accountability” is adopted to refer a broader range of processes for determining the legal 
wrongfulness of state behavior and appropriate consequences than the law of state 
responsibility. 
15.  Gabriella Blum, The Crime and Punishment of States, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 57 
(2013). 
16.  For purposes of this discussion, the concept of liberalism is located in legal 
philosophy and political theory in that it refers to a basic legal and political commitment to 
individual rights and freedoms and a system of government designed to curtail abuse of state 
power on individual rights. Of particular relevance is that one of the core individual rights in a 
liberal system include the individual right to be free from arbitrary arrest and punishment. 
Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal 
Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1013 (2005). A key principle of liberal legal systems is that 
individuals may be punished only for individual acts and therefore collective or un-
individuated attribution of responsibility is antithetical to respect for individual autonomy and 
freedom. Liberal assignation of criminal guilt for mass atrocities is perhaps most famously 
captured by German philosopher Karl Jaspers. Writing in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, Jaspers reasoned that the German ‘people’ could not be legally guilty for the acts of 
German leaders, but had moral or metaphysical guilt. KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF 
GERMAN GUILT 32, 51-52, 73-74 (E.B. Ashton Trans., 1947). Thus in this discussion “liberal” 
conceptions of criminality refer to attribution of legal responsibility to individuals for violating 
legal norms. 
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leaders and spares the people from collective guilt. Debates about 
accountability endogenous to transitional justice focus on the priority 
that should be given to criminal trials.17 However, these debates are 
bound together with debates about the role of law and the extent to 
which legalism18 and legal solutions should guide the field. Legal 
accountability is understood to mean individual criminal 
responsibility and State responsibility disappears from transitional 
justice theorizations of legal justice. 
A third factor that contributes to this blinkered approach to 
international accountability for mass violence is the law itself. The 
modern international legal system developed to disaggregate 
consideration of individuals and States as culpable actors in 
international law. The conventional understanding of how 
international individual criminal responsibility became the central 
feature of international justice draws a straight line from the 
Nuremberg Principles and trials to the ICC. In other words, liberal 
theories of retributive justice and deterrence captured the conceptions 
of international justice. Yet taking into account the full range of 
responses of the Allies to Germany and Japan and the broader 
developments of international law that emerged from the war, we see 
that other conceptions of accountability and legal responsibility for 
mass atrocities were circulating and taking shape in positive law and 
international institutions. The Allies not only established the 
Nuremberg tribunal, but also exacted war reparations from Germany, 
and instituted sweeping reforms of its State institutions. In the 
immediate postwar period, nations invested heavily in developing a 
new international legal system that built on normative aspects of this 
response. Yet nations undertook efforts to codify and develop the 
international legal framework as separate international branches of 
law: international criminal law, international human rights law, and 
                                                                                                             
17.  Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Editorial Note, 7 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 383, 388-90 (2013); 
Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of Transitional 
Democratic Governments, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 71-88 (1988). 
18.  Legalism is a key concept associated with liberal thought. As articulated by Judith 
Shklar in her defining work on the topic, legalism is “the ethical attitude that hold moral 
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationship to consist of duties and rights 
determined by rules.” JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 
1 (1986). Shklar argued that legalism defines a system of thought, a political ideology, which 
understands law as apart from the social world in which it operates. Id. at 2. Within the field of 
transitional justice, scholars have questioned the prevalence of legalism as manifest by a 
preference for legal (as opposed to non-legal) solutions to the legacies of mass violence. See 
infra Part II. 
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the law of international State responsibility. These branches have 
assumed varying levels of legal and institutional development. More 
importantly for purposes of this discussion, these branches are not 
integrated conceptually into a theory and discourse of international 
justice. One result is that it is the Nuremberg legacy and not the 
measures of State accountability that has become entrenched in 
transitional justice; State measures of legal responsibility lie outside 
the ambit of international justice. 
Without a discourse that includes State culpability under the 
banner of international justice and accountability, transitional justice 
cedes important conceptual and practical ground in addressing 
atrocity crimes. A justice discourse that included calls to address State 
wrongdoing has legal purchase. While positive law does not admit of 
State crimes, nonetheless legal recourse against States is possible 
through the doctrine of State responsibility. Remedies for State 
breaches could extend to the robust measures imposed on Germany 
and Japan by the Allies after World War II, including reparations to 
victims for the harms caused by State, loss of territory, international 
administration, or other reforms of State institutions. 
Structural reforms of State institutions are familiar as part of 
peace negotiations. However, pursuing such measures as legal 
obligations pursues important normative as well as material goals. 
Linked with an international determination of breach of obligations 
erga omnes, legal remedies would convey culpability and 
blameworthiness, central values of individual criminal responsibility. 
It is also possible that structural reforms may more muscular if legally 
grounded as remedies for justice measures than if such efforts were 
pursued as peacekeeping or policy options. However, to change its 
conceptualization of accountability, transitional justice needs to 
overcome its mistakenly liberal objections to State culpability and 
promote a new politics of international accountability. International 
law does not run afoul of liberal tenants by treating States as singular 
entities of political governance and attributing legal responsibility to 
them for breaches of international rules. Attribution of wrongfulness 
to a State is a political, not legal, resistance. Change may begin with 
new conceptual clarity that understands State culpability not as 
collective punishment but as part of a process of holding the State 
accountable for its involvement in international crimes as an artificial, 
politically constructed entity distinct from “the people.” This 
perspective would allow an international justice discourse and 
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practice to emerge, recognizing that individual and State 
responsibility co-exist comfortably and may be pursued, as 
appropriate, as a holistic and legitimate responses to mass atrocities. 
At the outset, it is important to clarify the parameters of this 
project. This analysis concentrates on international legal processes of 
accountability and determinations of legal responsibility for atrocity 
crimes. While domestic legal systems are also capable of—and many 
have been—implementing justice for international crimes and 
addressing the role of the State in perpetrating atrocities, this Article 
limits its examination to the international system. The content and 
circulation within domestic contexts of concepts of international legal 
accountability and responsibility are indeed critical to a 
comprehensive understanding of the global implementation of justice. 
However, the primary goal of this Article is narrower: to identify how 
conceptions of international accountability have developed to exclude 
State culpability and some of the effects of this theorization. 
Similarly, while States are not the only entities that perpetrate 
international crimes, this analysis does not consider non-State actors 
or organizations as targets of legal responsibility for their 
wrongdoing. The positive law regarding non-State actors continues to 
evolve, but the differential treatment of non-State and State entities 
under international law means that a separate analysis of 
accountability for non-State actors is required. Finally, this piece does 
not advance a definitive prescription for how international legal 
responsibility should be implemented. A thorough treatment of that 
question lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, by way of 
example, this Article illustrates one existing mechanism to pursue 
international State legal accountability: the UN Security Council. 
The first Section of this Article reviews the relevant legal 
developments of international norms and mechanisms from the end of 
the Second World War to the present. This illustrates the conceptions 
of accountability circulating in international law at the time, as well as 
how these branches developed with distinct trajectories, legal 
instruments, and enforcement mechanisms. The second Section turns 
to an examination of how accountability is conceptualized in 
transitional justice and reveals the ways in which transitional justice 
submerges legal accountability of the State. The third Section 
considers some of the effects of the status quo. The recent examples 
of Security Council referrals to the ICC illustrate how the political 
organ of international accountability, the best current option to 
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enforce State responsibility, performs the transitional justice meme of 
Nuremberg by insisting on individual criminal accountability while 
ignoring State criminality. This Section identifies conceptual 
challenges to transitional justice that illuminate the vise grip of 
liberalism on the field and a new transitional justice politics is 
imagined. The final Section concludes by calling for transitional 
justice to marshal the full international law commitment to 
accountability. Attending to distinct roles and responsibilities the 
individual and State in the commission of atrocities furthers the 
values of international rule of law and activates remedies 
commensurate with the challenge to ensure a sustainable peace. 
I. THE POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
BRANCHES REGULATING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MASS 
CRIMES: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The response of the Allies to atrocities committed during the 
Second World War spawned two new branches of law: international 
human rights law and international criminal law. The Allies also 
relied on longstanding interstate obligations to exact war reparations 
from Germany.19 A brief review of these developments reminds us of 
the exceptional legal growth during this period. It also reminds us that 
the legal foundations for a robust, holistic approach to dual 
responsibility exist. 
We can consider the Potsdam Protocol,20 the instrument laying 
out the principles that would control the Allies’ transition of Germany 
and Japan from enemies to allies, as a conceptual blueprint for what 
pursuit of dual accountability might look like. With this in mind, we 
see that the postwar developments of international law differentially 
advanced the document’s commitment to accountability for 
individuals and States. If the Nuremberg prosecutions served as the 
prototype for international criminal trials, the reparations provisions 
along with the legal, economic, and political reform mandated by the 
Potsdam Protocol offered a model for legal consequences to be 
imposed upon States that violate jus cogens norms to commit mass 
                                                                                                             
19.  Ariel Colonomos & Andrea Armstrong, German Reparations to the Jews after 
World War II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
REPARATIONS 390-419 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006). 
20.  Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9. 
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atrocities.21 International criminal law has assumed an advanced form 
with establishment of a permanent criminal court. However, 
normative development of the law of State responsibility stalled, and 
State responsibility for human rights violations developed as a new 
branch of international law with its own treaties and enforcement 
mechanisms. The end result is that we have a fully articulated system 
of international criminal law, while there is no parallel system to 
enforce State responsibility for the same violations. The human rights 
system offers a partial response but is not conceived of normatively or 
structurally as a legal redress mechanism for system criminality. Such 
a system requires the ability to tie legal responsibility to States with 
commensurate remedial action. 
The provisions of the Potsdam Protocol, while not conceived as 
measures of reparation for state responsibility by its drafters,22 fit 
within this legal category. These initiatives offer inspiration for the 
type of systemic change that could be implemented as part of legal 
accountability. To understand the conceptual distance that must be 
traveled to come to this point, it is necessary to understand how the 
seeds of the international justice movement developed wholly apart 
from attention to system criminality and the problem of dual 
responsibility for international crimes. This Section reviews the 
development of international criminal law and enforcement 
mechanisms from Nuremberg to the establishment of a permanent 
International Criminal Court. It then examines the evolution of the 
law of State responsibility and human rights over the same period. We 
see how these latter two branches took shape such that they house the 
legal potential for State accountability for atrocity crimes, but are 
unable to fully realize the Potsdam model. All three legal branches of 
international law developed centrifugally in relation to mass violence 
                                                                                                             
21.  See Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9, §§ (a)(II)(A)-(B). 
22.  The first mention of structural, legal, and/or policy reforms as a legal remedy for 
state violations, known as a guarantee of non-recurrence or non-repetition, within the 
international human rights system was in a 1993 report. Theo van Boven, (U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental), Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, ¶¶ 47, 48, 55, section IX, principle 
11; Pablo de Greiff, (Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence), Report to the Human Rights Council, ¶ 15, n.4, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/30/42, (Sept. 7, 2015) [hereinafter de Greiff Report]. 
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so that normatively and institutionally they work against a holistic 
response to global horrors that call out for our full attention. 
A. International Criminal Law 
After a period of internal disagreement, at the Potsdam 
Conference in July 1945, the Allies agreed to conduct criminal 
prosecutions of major war criminals. Two years earlier, the Allies had 
established a commission to collect evidence of war crimes.23 
Initially, the British favored the arrest and immediate executions of a 
small group of top identified war criminals.24 The contrary views of 
US Secretary of War Henry Stimson eventually carried the day.25 
Justice Robert H. Jackson, the prosecutor at Nuremberg, argued that 
rule of law and adherence to liberal accountability were necessary to 
deal with the Nazi leaders. He reasoned that retribution for large-scale 
suffering required piercing State sovereignty to reach the individuals 
responsible for ordering war crimes: “The idea that a state, any more 
than a corporation, commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are 
committed only by persons . . . . [I]t is quite intolerable to let such a 
legalism become the basis of personal immunity.”26 
A month later, the Allies concluded the Nuremberg Charter in 
what commentators have heralded as a critical pivot point in 
international law.27 These documents created an international tribunal 
                                                                                                             
23.  M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need 
to Establish a Permanent Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 22-23 (1997) 
[hereinafter From Versailles to Rwanda]. 
24.  TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL 
MEMOIR 29 (1992); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 306-09 (4th ed. 2013). 
25.  Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 179 
(1947). He argued that prosecutions rather than a night of the long knives would better reflect 
on Allies as civilized nations in comparison to the barbarism of the Nazi regime. U.S. 
Secretary of State Hull supported Stimson in this regard and argued that establishing the truth 
of Nazi crimes before a world audience via a legal process would ensure the Germans could 
not later evade the moral and political implications of the verdict as they had with Versailles 
treaty. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 307-08. The German government later had claimed that 
the admission of German guilt in the treaty had been exacted under duress. Id. at 354. 
26.  Justice Robert H. Jackson, Opening Speech at the Nuremberg Tribunal, THE 
JACKSON CENTER (Nov. 21, 1945), http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-
articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/opening-statement-before-the-international-
military-tribunal/ [hereinafter Opening Speech]; see also Benjamin B. Ferencz, Tribute to 
Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 365, 365-69 (2004). 
27.  M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 66-67, 
112-13 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW]. 
462 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:447 
to prosecute the Nazi architects of mass destruction of Jews and other 
targets of persecution. The unprecedented scale and nature of Nazi 
atrocities prompted the powerful States to create an exception to the 
Westphalian notion of international law as a system of interstate 
regulation. The sovereign immunity that had shielded individuals 
from direct sanction yielded to the demands that those responsible be 
punished. The Nuremberg judgment, reached a little over a year later, 
solidified the principle that individuals have duties that “transcend the 
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state” for 
which they may be prosecuted notwithstanding orders of superiors.28 
At the same time, the Allies prosecuted members of the Japanese 
High Command in trials that lasted from May 1946 to November 
1948,29 and national trials of war criminals that took place in Allied 
countries in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War 
signaled a new international commitment to justice. 
The newly created UN General Assembly embraced this liberal 
concept of international justice. In 1946, it unanimously adopted a 
resolution affirming the principles of the Nuremberg judgment as 
international law principles thereby essentially ratifying the existence 
of international criminal law30 and moved toward codifying 
international crimes and creating a mechanism to enforce them. As 
part of the UN’s broader efforts to develop an international legal 
system, the UN General Assembly created the International Law 
Commission (“ILC” or “Commission”), a body of experts charged 
with promoting the development and codification of international 
law.31 At the request of the General Assembly in 1947, the ILC 
undertook to formulate the Nuremberg Principles and prepare a draft 
code of international offenses.32 The ILC prepared a first text of the 
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
                                                                                                             
28.  Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgment and 
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 221 (1947). 
29.  ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 365; see From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 24, 
at 31-37. 
30.  G.A. Res. 95 (I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by 
the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1/95 (Dec. 11, 1946); G.A. Res. 177 
(II) (Nov. 21, 1947).. 
31.  G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947). 
32.  G.A. Res. 177 (II), supra note 30. The UN General Assembly called on the ILC 
predecessor organization, the Committee on the Codification of International Law, to 
formulate the Nuremberg Principles and prepare a draft code. The Committee began this work, 
which the ILC inherited and completed. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 
supra note 27, at 579. 
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(“Draft Code”) in 1951, followed by a revised version in 1954.33 
Concurrently, formulation of a draft statute for establishing a 
permanent criminal court was delegated to another special rapporteur, 
who argued that the task of developing a substantive criminal code 
and a statute for an international criminal code should complement 
one another.34 Yet these two projects remained purposefully 
separated.35 The General Assembly constituted a Special Committee 
to prepare a draft statute for a permanent criminal court (“Draft 
Statute”).36 However, the completion of both the Draft Code and 
Draft Statute was ultimately tabled until the UN had arrived at an 
agreed definition of the crime of aggression.37 
The Cold War largely froze further development and 
enforcement of international criminal law.38 Certainly there continued 
to be atrocities committed in international armed conflicts—the 
                                                                                                             
33.  Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 9 at 133-37, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
123, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/48; see also LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
8-10 (1997). The title of the Draft Code was changed to the “Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind” in 1988. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 27, at 579. Note the ILC only drafted principles but did not discuss the 
evolution of international criminal law principles from positive law. See Ruti Teitel, 
Transitional Justice: Postwar Legacies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615, 1619 n.2 (2006) (“The 
dilemma raised at Nuremberg relating to the rule of law catalyzed a debate on the nature of 
international norms and the extent to which these could be considered consistent with positive 
law. Ultimately, Nuremberg would imply a move away from support of positivist principles of 
interpretation and towards an endorsement of natural law principles.”); see also Quincy 
Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 405, 406-14 
(1948). 
34.   INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 580. 
35.  Report of the Committee on International Criminal Court Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. 
A/2135 (1952). Bassiouni attributes the separate tracks of developing a code and a court to the 
reluctance of powerful states to establish an international criminal justice system: “the lack of 
synchronization was not entirely fortuitous: it was the result of a political will to delay the 
establishment of an international criminal court, because that was a time when the world was 
sharply divided and frequently at risk of war.” INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 27, at 583. 
36.   INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 581. 
37.  M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT 
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 8 (2d rev. & updated ed., 1987); 
SUNGA, supra note 33, at 15, 40-45. 
38.  After the World War II criminal tribunals, there were no internationally-sponsored 
criminal trials until the UN established the ad hoc criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
However, there were a handful of national criminal trials against perpetrators of crimes 
committed during the Second World War, notably the Israeli prosecution of Adolf Eichmann. 
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (2006); 
see also From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 23, at 38-39. 
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unsuccessful war of secession in Biafra, the ultimately successful but 
bloody war of independence in Bangladesh, and the My Lai massacre 
by American forces in South Vietnam. Yet the geopolitical impasse of 
the Communist bloc and the West assured that no international 
consensus could be reached that would rise above ideology to punish 
those responsible for mass atrocities.39 
The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a new era in international 
criminal justice. Many heralded the post-Cold War realignment as 
bringing democracy’s freedom and prosperity to former Communist 
states.40 The breakup of Yugoslavia loosened the restraints of Tito’s 
communist State, which the leader had secured through an ideology 
of “Brotherhood and Unity.”41 The rise of nationalism across the 
ethnically mixed Balkan republics sparked the violent breakup of the 
Yugoslav federation. From 1991-1995, fighting in Croatia and Bosnia 
took the form of violent ethnic cleansing of civilian populations, the 
epitome of which was Bosnian Serb forces overrunning the UN-
protected hamlet of Srebrenica and slaughtering 8,000 Bosniak men 
and boys;42 literally committing genocide under the nose of United 
Nations peacekeeping forces. 
Aided by the 24-hour news cycle, the Balkan conflict unfolded 
in the full gaze of the international community. Diplomats and world 
leaders took notice and action. In the midst of the fighting, in May 
1993, the UN Security Council acted under its Chapter VII powers to 
establish an international criminal tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.43 International 
criminal justice continued to gain momentum. In November 1994, the 
Security Council created another criminal tribunal, this time to 
prosecute perpetrators of genocide and other international crimes 
committed in Rwanda.44 Unleashed after the plane carrying Hutu 
President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down on April 6th, organized 
                                                                                                             
39.   INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 565-66. 
40.  See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 
(1992). 
41.  Tone Bringa, The Peaceful Death of Tito and the Violent End of Yugoslavia, in 
DEATH OF THE FATHER: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE END IN POLITICAL AUTHORITY 148-200 
(John Borneman ed., 2004). 
42.  Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J 43, 
83-84, 155-56 (Feb. 26)). 
43.  S.C. Res. 827, (May 25, 1993). 
44.  S.C. Res. 955, (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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ethnic militias called the Interahamwe rampaged throughout the 
Rwandan capital and countryside, targeting ethnic Tutsis for 
gruesome killing.45 In the end, Interahamwe forces killed 
approximately 800,000 Tutsis over 100 days; the bloodshed halted by 
the Tutsi rebel invasion in July 1994.46 With UN involvement, the 
conflicts in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone were followed by 
the establishment of specialized criminal tribunals to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes.47 
This trend toward international criminal accountability as a 
component of post-conflict peace reached a new level in 2002, when 
the world’s first permanent international criminal court began 
operating. Its creation owes a debt to the postwar efforts at the UN to 
codify international criminal law. The General Assembly considered 
creating a draft code of international crimes again in 1981.48 
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46.  Id. 
47.  In 2000, the UN Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (“UNTAET”) passed a 
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Tribunal for Lebanon. S.C. Res. 1757 (May 30, 2007). 
48.  In 1981, the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the ILC to resume its 
prior work on the Draft Code. SUNGA, supra note 33, at 9; see also G.A. Res. 36/106 (Dec. 10, 
1981). By this time, a definition for the “crime of aggression” had been adopted (in 1974), 
removing the reason for tabling progress on the Draft Code. SUNGA, supra note 33, at 79-80. 
Additionally, efforts by a number of governments and NGOs had forced the issue back onto 
the General Assembly’s agenda. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra 
note 27, at 582. 
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However, revival of international criminal accountability really 
gained momentum in 1991 when, against the backdrop of fighting in 
Croatia, the ILC generated an official version of a new Draft Code.49 
A year later, the General Assembly requested the ILC to prepare a 
draft statute for a permanent criminal court.50 Thus the drafting of a 
code of international crimes and a mechanism for their enforcement 
proceeded on separate tracks.51 
Preparations for a permanent court got underway in earnest in 
1994, when the General Assembly constituted an ad hoc committee to 
develop a process to establish a court based on the ILC’s Draft 
Statute.52 Over the next four years, State representatives negotiated a 
treaty to establish a permanent court,53 the final text of which, the 
                                                                                                             
49.  In 1991, the ILC adopted a comprehensive catalog of crimes, the scope of which far 
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53.  Following the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly set up the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“PrepCom”), 
which would meet twice in 1996 and prepare “consolidated texts” for a draft international 
criminal court statute. U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 87th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 ¶ 2 
(Dec. 11, 1995); INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 589. 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), was adopted in 
Rome in 1998 on a vote of 120-7 (with 21 abstentions).54 Four years 
later, with the requisite 60 State ratifications, the treaty entered into 
force. UN officials, State leaders, representatives of NGOs, and 
international commentators hailed the ICC as fulfilling the unstated 
promise symbolized by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals almost 50 
years prior:55 as part of its commitment to value human dignity, the 
rule of law, and peace, the international community would confront 
mass atrocities through individual criminal responsibility. Equipped 
with a standing international court with jurisdiction over the most 
serious crimes, “never again” would not be a trope but a serious 
commitment to guide international efforts to end impunity for those 
who waged large-scale, illegal, and brutal campaigns. 
The power of the idea of international criminal justice is 
manifest in its fruition. With the ICC, international criminal 
responsibility is now a permanent feature of the international legal 
order. The legal form this takes is the criminal trial. Like domestic 
criminal law, it is quintessentially a liberal exercise in retributive 
justice. However, as conceived in international law by the Allies who 
initiated criminal trials, international criminal responsibility is further 
justified by liberalism’s aversion to collective punishment. German 
philosopher Karl Jaspers theorized this idea as a categorical rejection 
of the possibility that the German “people” could be legally guilty for 
the acts of German leaders.56 The more recent propulsion of 
international criminal sanctions in response to mass violence has been 
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aided by scholars who similarly argue that prosecutions of individual 
leaders are a vital tool to avoid collective guilt.57 
Individual criminal responsibility has become the form of legal 
accountability for atrocities meted out by the international system. 
Thus the idea of State legal accountability for atrocities is implicitly 
excluded from the project of international justice. Yet at the same 
time that the Nuremberg Principles are being formulated, States are 
undertaking projects that understand States are actors capable of 
committing acts of grave harm and which seek to establish 
international regulations that will hold them accountable for such 
transgressions. These projects were not integrated into the 
conceptualization or institutionalization of international criminal law 
but demonstrate the doctrinal and institutional firewall of dual 
responsibility. 
B. State Responsibility and Human Rights 
While international criminal responsibility gains legitimacy from 
its liberal foundations, longstanding international principles of State 
responsibility establish State legal accountability for their breaches of 
international obligations without being discredited as illiberal. Partly, 
this is due to conceptions of sovereignty under international law 
which treat states as singular actors and not “the people;”58 also, the 
rejection of State crimes in positive law means that States may violate 
legal obligations but such violations are not formally criminal. Thus it 
is possible to speak of State legal violations and breaches but not of 
State legal guilt and culpability. 
Yet, there is an element of legal fiction to this distinction. 
Postwar developments to codify international law, in particular in the 
areas of State responsibility and human rights, indicate that 
preventing State atrocities and holding States legally responsible for 
such abuses were central to efforts establishing this new world order. 
Furthermore, the reparations measures imposed against the defeated 
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Germany certainly conveyed moral condemnation and the normative 
optics of the interventions blurred the traditional line between civil 
and penal sanctions. As remedies for State breaches, these measures 
included monetary payments and restitution.59 The political goals of 
the Allied occupation of postwar Germany were to refashion the 
defeated enemy into a pacific, democratic State.60 The principles of 
the Potsdam Protocol should be understood as defining the type of 
initiatives that can be pursued as legal measures of accountability for 
State criminality insofar as these are directed to prevent State 
repetition of the abuses. Thus the Allied response to Nazi criminality 
included not just international criminal liability but also aimed to 
realign the State institutions and reform the structures of the Nazi 
State that enabled its violence. 
The political and economic reforms of the German State outlined 
in the Potsdam Protocol did not become a blueprint for international 
law and practice as did the war crimes prosecutions of Nazi leaders. 
The postwar codification efforts of State responsibility and human 
rights developed separately from each other as well as international 
criminal law and did not result in a set of legal regulations or a 
mechanism that could address individual and State wrongdoing 
together. The next section outlines the rise and fall of State crimes in 
the effort to develop international law for a new age. It then turns to 
the development of the international human rights regime where State 
responsibility takes a particular legal form, which at best offers a 
partial substitute for the Potsdam Protocol model. As a result, the 
international legal system permits legal guilt to attach only to 
individuals and not to States, and largely leaves enforcement of the 
international law of State responsibility for mass atrocities to the 
human rights regime. The conceptual untethering of State guilt and 
legal responsibility from international justice has drained transitional 
justice of important tools to address mass violence in a holistic 
manner. Nevertheless, the legal concepts necessary to do so exist. 
                                                                                                             
59.  Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations, 23 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 314, 322-24 (2005). 
60.  Potsdam Protocol, supra note 9, § (a)(II)(A)(3)(iv) (“The purposes of the 
occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are . . . [t]o prepare for 
the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual 
peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.”). 
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1. Codification Efforts of State Responsibility 
The Holocaust and other mass horrors require State policies and 
structures to perpetrate. How did the new international order wish to 
address accountability of States for such acts going forward? The 
establishment of the United Nations brought States into a formal 
collective, but one which, by design, accepted State sovereign 
equality as a founding principle. It thus relied on State agreement to 
accept regulation of its conduct except in narrow circumstances.61 
Given the backdrop of World War II, it is not surprising that 
strengthening the international law of State responsibility was one of 
the earliest topics taken up by the ILC, for this would clarify how 
State breaches of international obligations are determined as well as 
the legal consequences for such conduct. Nor should it be surprising 
that this effort addressed responsibility for State “crimes.” However, 
the fact that the Commission took over 45 years to complete its work 
and that the final document makes no explicit mention of State crimes 
indicates the difficulty of achieving State consensus on this issue. 
Over time, consensus on this point dissipated, and in the end, the final 
document only indirectly acknowledges State crimes. 
a. Efforts to Define State Responsibility for International Crimes 
The ILC began its work in 1955 to prepare a draft of 
international law principles that would govern State responsibility, 
and Francisco García-Amador was appointed as the Special 
Rapporteur leading the effort.62 A total of six Special Rapporteurs 
shepherded the process, generating multiple reports (styled as reports, 
these documents served as proposed drafts of principles which the 
ILC would consider for further action), and which concluded in 2001 
when the ILC adopted the draft articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles” or “Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility”).63 The drafting process saw substantial 
                                                                                                             
61.  The power to authorize military force, the ultimate exercise of coercive state action, 
is reserved to the UN Security Council in circumstances necessary to maintain or restore peace 
and security. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
62.   Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/94, at 42 (1955). 
63.  The ILC, composed of international legal experts drawn from various segments of 
the international legal community, forwarded its proposals for codification to a subgroup of 
state representatives (the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly), which then deliberates 
and may reject or forward drafts to the General Assembly. In this way, ILC’s work to develop 
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changes to key concepts over time, including State crimes, reflecting 
the evolution of available legal common ground. The Commission’s 
first Special Rapporteur, García-Amador, included State crimes in his 
reports on the subject,64 and this principle remained a live issue 
through decades of drafting, though subject to frequent debate. The 
arguments advanced by proponents and opponents of State crimes 
reflect divisions in thought over fundamental questions about the 
nature of international law as well as its utility in regulating State 
behavior. 
Throughout the drafting history, there appeared to be broad 
consensus that not all State breaches were of the same character; in 
other words, there was a difference between a merely “wrongful” 
State action and State offenses that were particularly egregious or 
“criminal.”65 Partly, this reflected a postwar acceptance of the need 
for international law to respond to State-sponsored violence like that 
unleashed by the Nazi regime. This view was also consistent with the 
traditional international law principle that States are responsible for 
reparations for any wrongful breach. This principle reflects a tort, or 
civil, liability model of State accountability, which includes the 
possibility of punitive sanctions for “wrongful” State acts as a form of 
reparation.66 Through subsequent years of reports and discussion, the 
concept of State crimes took hold and was reflected in acceptance of a 
bifurcation of state breaches—those that were delicts, or merely 
wrongful, and those that were crimes. This framework was reflected 
in the first draft of the instrument formally adopted by the 
                                                                                                             
and codify international law is ultimately controlled by states in this exercise of positive law 
generation. 
64.  See, e.g., F.V. García-Amador (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), First 
Rep. on Int’l Responsibility, ¶¶ 46-53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (Jan. 20, 1956). 
65.  James Crawford, The System of International Responsibility, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 17, 22 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
66.  See, e.g., F.V. García-Amador (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Sixth 
Rep. on Int’l Responsibility, ¶¶ 56, 145. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134 and Add.1 (Jan. 26, 1961) 
(“[B]oth in diplomatic practice and in the case-law of the claims commissions, the reparation 
of an injury caused to an alien individual is fairly often frankly ‘punitive’ in character. Its 
purpose—namely, to punish or at least reprove a State for its conduct—either explicitly or 
implicitly, and thereby to try to prevent a repetition of such acts in the future, is in fact the 
most characteristic and distinctive feature of this mode of reparation.”). In this view, accepting 
sanctions for egregious behavior did not necessarily introduce the municipal notion of 
“criminal” sanctions into international law because the purpose of sanctions was reparative 
rather than punitive and thus did not distort traditional conceptions of regulation of interstate 
relations. 
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Commission in 1980.67 Article 19 recognized a distinction between 
“delicts” and “international crimes” (exceptionally grave breaches of 
international law).68 
Although there was agreement regarding a hierarchy of 
breaches, there was disagreement about how to identify which 
breaches constituted crimes—in particular whether all peremptory 
norms qualified as crimes69—as well as what should be the 
consequences for such breaches.70 States had categorical objections to 
                                                                                                             
67.  See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Thirty-Second Session, ¶¶ 34-48, 
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980). 
68.  See id. ¶ 34, art. 19 (“International crimes and international delicts—(1) An act of a 
State which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful 
act, regardless of the subject-matter of the obligation breached. (2) An internationally wrongful 
act which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the 
protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized 
as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime.”). 
69.  See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, ¶¶ 75-122, 
U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976) (including Draft Article 19 and accompanying commentary); 
Marina Spinedi, International Crimes of State: The Legislative History, in INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLE 19, 21-22 (Joseph 
Weiler, Antonio Cassese & Marina Spinedi eds., 1989). In coming to his conclusion, Ago 
analyzed relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, resolutions of the General 
Assembly, and international case law, including in particular the ruling of the ICJ in the 
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd. case. See Barcelona Traction, Light & 
Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). 
70.  See, e.g., Roberto Ago (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep. 
on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 (Apr. 20, 1970); Gaetano 
Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fourth Rep. on State 
Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/444 and Add.1-3 (1992); Gaetano 
Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Third Rep. on State Responsibility, 
Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/440 (July 19, 1991); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Special 
Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1 (1989); Willem Riphagen (Special 
Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fifth Rep. on the Content, Forms and Degrees of Int’l 
Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/380 and Corr.1 (Apr. 4, 1984); Willem 
Riphagen (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fourth Rep. on the Content, Forms 
and Degrees of Int’l Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366 and Add.1 & 
Add.1/Corr.1 (1983); Willem Riphagen (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Third 
Rep. on the Content, Forms and Degrees of Int’l Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/354 and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2 (1982); Willem Riphagen, (Special Rapporteur on 
State Responsibility), Second Rep. on the Content, Forms and Degrees of Int’l Responsibility, 
Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/344 and Corr.1 & Corr.2 (May 1, 1981); Roberto Ago 
(Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 and Add.1 (1972); Roberto Ago (Special Rapporteur on 
State Responsibility), Third Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/246 and Add.1-3 (1971); Robert Ago (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), 
Second Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 (Apr. 20, 
1970). 
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State crimes and the concept of penal sanctions;71 many 
representatives of States opposed codification based on fears that 
powerful States would use State crimes to coerce less powerful,72 and 
others raised procedural objections regarding how and who would 
define State crimes and what and whether procedural safeguards 
could be sufficient to ensure States would not be unfairly punished.73 
Undergirding these debates was a debate about the nature of 
international law itself and whether “wrongs” in international law 
could be conceptualized properly according to municipal law, 
whether as torts or crimes, or whether wrongs in international law 
were of another character entirely.74 
b. Differentiation of International Legal Responsibility 
Ultimately, the objections to State crimes carried the day. States 
relegated criminal accountability for mass violence the exclusive 
domain of international criminal law. The final bargain that the Draft 
Articles struck was recognition of State responsibility for jus cogens 
violations and erga omnes obligations but dropped explicit reference 
to State crimes, their definition, consequences for their commission, 
and a mechanism to enforce them. Interestingly, this took place 
contemporaneous to the drafting of the statute for the ICC—an 
undertaking that required States to address these same issues with 
                                                                                                             
71.   JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 393 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press ed. 2013); Georges Abi-Saab, The Uses of Article 19, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 339, 
341-42 (1999); Gilbert Guillame, Overview of Part One of the Articles on State Responsibility, 
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 187, 190. In addition, 
state practice did not support recognition of state crimes since at that time, no state had ever 
been accused of criminal conduct before an international court. Abi-Saab, supra, at 345. 
72.   Int’l Law Comm’n, Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488 and Add.1-3, 112-23 (1998). For instance, “absence of institutional 
control over interpretive disagreements would play [into] the hands of the powerful States.” 
Martti Koskenniemi, Doctrines of State Responsibility, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 45, 49. 
73.  See James Crawford (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), First Rep. on 
State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶¶ 84-86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/490 and Add.1-7 (1998) 
[hereinafter First Rep. on State Responsibility]. 
74.  See Draft Convention on “Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their 
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners” Prepared by Harvard Law School (1929), 
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n at 229-30, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l; Alain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibility in International 
Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 71, at 3, 3-16; Antoine 
Ollivier, International Criminal Responsibility of the State, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 703, 714. 
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regard to individual accountability. James Crawford, the sixth Special 
Rapporteur and the one who eliminated the controversial Article 19 
from the draft, spearheaded the final effort to submit Draft Articles at 
the same time as the treaty negotiations for the International Criminal 
Court entered full swing.75 
Opposition to Draft Article 19 stemmed in part from arguments 
that individual criminal accountability was the appropriate providence 
for sanctioning the commission of atrocities, and that recognition of 
State crimes would undermine prosecutions of individuals for such 
acts.76 States also emphasized that the international system designated 
the Security Council as the appropriate body to consider how best to 
address acts that would be considered state crimes as threats to peace 
and security.77 And in any case, the Draft Articles would not affect 
the Security Council’s exercise of its powers.78 
While a far cry from the explicit recognition of State crimes in 
the earlier draft, commentators point out that the final document is 
more flexible than it might seem and arguably creates “public 
interest” standing that allows any State to call for State accountability 
for breaches of peremptory norms,79 and collective enforcement by 
States could include not only cessation and other forms of reparations 
but also countermeasures.80 Scholars have argued that the Draft 
                                                                                                             
75.  The PrepCom issued its final report in October 1996. INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 27, at 594. Crawford dropped the language of 
state crimes from the draft in 1996, the same year states finalize the Rome Statute. See Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas, Responsibility and the United Nations Charter, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,  supra note 71, at 115, 120. Interestingly, in negotiations of 
the Rome Statute, states opposed a draft provision on reparations that arguably would allow 
the court to make reparations awards against states on the ground that the court was limited to 
individual accountability. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE 
ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 263-64 (Roy S. K. Lee ed., 1999). 
76.  See First Rep. on State Responsibility, supra note 73, ¶¶ 53(a) and (c), 88 (“The 
need for that notion may also be reduced by the development of institutions for prosecuting 
and trying individuals for international crimes, as exemplified by the proposed international 
criminal court.”). 
77.  See id. ¶ 52 (c) and (e). 
78.  Id. ¶ 87. 
79.  James Crawford, Overview of Part Three of the Articles on State Responsibility, in 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65, at 931, 934. 
80.  See Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
art. 41 ¶ 3, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 41 ¶ 3, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) 
[hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility],  (“This article is without prejudice to the 
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Articles offer an important framework, upon which States can build. 
In 2001, the UN recognized the final proposed text but has not taken 
further action to turn the draft principles into a treaty.81 And the ICJ 
has ratified the ILC position that State criminality is not part of 
customary or principles of international law.82 In other words, the 
Draft Articles set a floor for agreement about State responsibility for 
peremptory norms (without limiting these further to those that might 
be “state crimes”) and do not prevent States from generating a more 
robust set of norms through treaty law that would delineate what 
constitutes State criminal behavior and creating an enforcement 
mechanism. 
The history of the Draft Articles illustrates how States jealously 
policed the boundaries of international criminal accountability. They 
curtailed acknowledgement that States may commit acts categorized 
as international crimes with the formal legal opprobrium that comes 
with criminal responsibility. If during the early postwar period it was 
conceivable that there would be an international accountability 
framework to implement legal responsibility of individuals and States 
that commit international crimes, the defeat of Article 19 and the 
completion of the Rome Statute meant the end of such ambition for a 
holistic approach. While breathing life into the Nuremberg Principles 
nearly 50 years after the fact with the creation of the ICC, States put 
the kybosh on State crimes even while recognizing that states may be 
implicated in international crimes. The normative condemnation that 
accompanies State culpability for system criminality is not available 
as a formal matter. Yet the international law remedies for State 
breaches offer a functional equivalent when accompanied by a finding 
of international legal responsibility for atrocity crimes.83 
                                                                                                             
other consequences referred to in this part and to such further consequences that a breach to 
which this chapter applies may entail under international law.”). 
81.  See G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 3, (Dec. 12, 2001) (taking note of the Articles and 
commending them to the attention of Governments, without prejudice to their future adoption 
as a treaty text or other appropriate action). 
82.  Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 167-70 (Feb. 27, 2007); James Crawford, 
International Crimes of State, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 
65, 403, 413-14. However, the court did find that states could be legally responsible for 
genocide under the Genocide Convention. See Saira Mohamed, A Neglected Option: The 
Contributions of State Responsibility for Genocide to Transitional Justice, 80 COL. L. REV. 
327 (2009). 
83.  Treaty law currently establishes some provision of state remedies for acts that are 
also international crimes, although these mechanisms are rarely used. The Genocide 
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Like the law of State responsibility, international human rights 
law establishes legal consequences for State violations of 
international obligations. Because of the overlap between acts that 
constitute international crimes and human rights violations, the 
conceptualization of State responsibility in human rights law bears on 
this inquiry. 
2. Human Rights Law 
If part of the impetus of the Allies for prosecuting members of 
the Nazi high command was to settle the score with Germany’s 
leaders for their responsibility for the horrors they unleashed, the 
Allies also worked to create a postwar order that could prevent the 
recurrence of similar destruction. These goals proceeded along 
parallel tracks. While the Nuremberg trials set in motion the 
development of international criminal law, the creation of the United 
Nations sparked the emergence of an international human rights 
regime. This began at the end of the war when high-level officials 
from the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China 
met at Dumbarton Oaks and pledged to create a new international 
institution that would serve to facilitate peaceful interstate relations—
a bulwark against another disastrous world war.84 Less than a year 
later, on June 26, 1945, representatives signed the United Nations 
Charter. The document includes in its preamble a commitment to 
human rights as one of the purposes of this new world institution.85 
                                                                                                             
Convention and the Geneva Conventions establish that offending states are liable for 
reparations in the event of breaches. Supra note 68. The provisions for reparations under the 
Geneva Conventions are also part of customary law. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Rule 149, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule149 (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); id., 
Rule 150. Here as well, the lack of an enforcement mechanism hampers the utility of this 
norm. CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR VICTIMS 
OF ARMED CONFLICT, 33 (2012). 
84.  History of the UN Charter, 1944-1945: Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1944-1945-
dumbarton-oaks-and-yalta/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
85.  ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 35; JACOB ROBINSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS—A COMMENTARY 
(1946); see U.N. Charter prmbl. (“We the peoples of the United Nations have determined . . . 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.”); U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3 (“The purposes of the 
United Nations are . . . [to] promot[e] and encourage[e] respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all”). 
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What were human rights and what conception of State 
responsibility do they embody? The Charter set out the structure to 
elaborate their content, but their animating idea was to universalize 
rights-based protection of the individual from abuse by the State. The 
Charter established the Economic and Social Council with power to 
set up a Human Rights Commission. Chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, 
the Commission set out to give content to the Charter’s lofty language 
of human rights. The Commission worked from April 1946 to 
December 1948 to draft an international instrument that established 
the “fundamental human rights” the Charter invoked.86 The result was 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which 
together with subsequent two human rights treaties is referred to as 
the International Bill of Rights. As the delegates hashed out what 
fundamental guarantees states should honor, the record of the horrors 
of the Nazi regime played in the background. According to Geoffrey 
Robertson: 
The most profound influence on the Commission was the 
evidence from the trial of the Nazi leaders, which lasted from 
Justice Jackson’s opening on 20 November 1945 to the judgment 
on 30 September 1946 . . . . The evidence upon which the 
judgment was based would provide the rationale for many of the 
clauses of the Universal Declaration.87 
Delegates received reports from the trials, which disclosed Nazi 
tactics of mass persecution. These served as cautionary tales for just 
how terrifying the power of State violence can be when the State 
apparatus is organized to target groups. Details about Einsatzgruppen 
massacres (German units deployed specifically to target and kill Jews, 
Gypsies, other civilians, and Soviet political commissars), the 
implementation of the Final Solution via a network of concentration 
camps, Dr. Mengele’s cruel “medical” experiments on Jewish 
prisoners, and other tactics of the Third Reich helped solidify the 
determination of delegates to establish universal principles to protect 
individual dignity.88 In particular, after receiving one such report, 
delegates drafted Article 2 of the UDHR which inscribes the State 
duty of non- discrimination based on “race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, policy or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
                                                                                                             
86.  Drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Historical Record of the 
Drafting Process, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://research.un.org/en/undhr. 
87.  ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 40. 
88.  Id. at 41-42. 
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birth or other status.”89 The record of the brutal depredations inflicted 
by the Nazis mounted and underscored the moral imperative to 
establish a framework for state recognition and guarantee of 
individual rights. 
The UDHR served as a statement of the fundamental individual 
rights that States in the modern era recognized and pledged to 
achieve. It also marked the beginning of a period of standard setting 
and formalization of these principles as legal obligations of States at 
the international level as well as through new regional organizations 
formed to facilitate and promote interstate cooperation. In a decades-
long process protracted by rising Cold War politics, in 1966 the 
Commission finalized two treaties, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (“IECSR”). These 
instruments elaborated the rights in the UDHR in a legally binding 
framework that for signatory States established a mechanism for 
independent experts to monitor State compliance. Since that time, the 
United Nations has generated additional human rights treaties focused 
on specific abuses, like torture90 and race discrimination91 or on 
particular groups like women,92 children,93 migrants,94 and the 
disabled.95 The international treaty system is complemented at the 
regional level by additional human rights treaty-based mechanisms, 
some of which, like the European and Inter-American, have stronger 
                                                                                                             
89.  Id; see JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT (1999); Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the 
Universal Declaration, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 357 (1993). Other rights were also drafted with the 
vivid memory of how the Nazi regime subverted individual rights through a system of control 
over public and private life including core principles like judicial independence, rule by 
popular consent, and the rights of families to have choice in their child’s education. 
ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 42. 
90.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
91.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Mar. 12, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
92.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S 13. 
93.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
94.  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3. 
95.  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Dec. 
13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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enforcement procedures than those provided through the UN treaties 
and have generated significant and binding judgments.96 
The conception of international accountability of States that 
violate human rights guarantees reflected in the UN treaty regime is 
consistent with the law of State responsibility: States may be legally 
responsible for acts that qualify as human rights violations and which 
are also international crimes but such breaches are not of a criminal 
nature. Such soft-pedaling is also indicative of the reluctance of States 
to agree to a strong enforcement regime. At the drafting of the UN 
Charter, States rejected proposals to make their commitment to 
protecting human rights legally binding or to include an enforcement 
mechanism like an international court.97 Equally telling is that 
powerful States defeated such initiatives, motivated by self-interest to 
insulate themselves from justice demands at home.98 These same 
debates resurfaced at the Commission during the drafting of the 
UDHR. Again, States turned down proposals to make the document a 
legally binding instrument and to establish a court to enforce it. 
Supporters of stronger measures argued these were needed to ensure 
that States could no longer look on as they did when Nazi Germany 
engaged in wholesale persecution of its own citizens, and argue that 
those were internal issues not of international concern.99 Yet, such 
statements failed to persuade the postwar great power States to agree 
to greater oversight. 
                                                                                                             
96.  DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 114-41 (2d 
ed., 2005). 
97.  ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 38-39. 
98.  Id. European colonial powers did not want to confer rights on colonial subjects, the 
United States sought to insulate its “Jim Crow” laws from international scrutiny, and Stalin 
had no desire to extend rights to prisoners in the Soviet gulag. Jochen von Bernstorff, The 
Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic 
Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903, 907-08 (2008) 
(“The allied powers, however, never had intended to grant the protection of human rights a 
central role in the institutional set up of the new world organization. Washington had an 
unfavourable domestic non-discrimination record, not just regarding African Americans; 
Moscow had established a highly repressive régime; and London had no interest in closer 
international scrutiny of its policies in the colonies.”). 
99.  French delegate Rene Cassin supported article 28, which guaranteed a just 
international order “in the hope of avoiding a repetition of what happened in 1933, when 
Germany began to massacre her own nationals and when other nationals refused to consider 
this a matter of international concern.” Quoted in ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 43; G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 28 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone is 
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
declaration can be fully realized.”). 
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In other words, States may violate individual human rights, but 
the enforcement system at the international level is relatively weak.100 
In this context, UN treaty bodies and other international instruments 
interpreting the content of State human rights obligations and the 
legal consequences for their breach have developed jurisprudence on 
the State duty to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for 
committing human rights violations that are also codified as criminal 
acts.101 This “duty to prosecute and punish” is now firmly established 
in human rights law.102 Normatively powerful, it dovetails with 
international criminal law’s liberal focus on individual culpability for 
atrocities. In this regard, the objective of both human rights and 
international criminal law is to punish individuals. Because legal 
culpability or guilt is reserved exclusively for individual actors, the 
role of the State in perpetration of mass violence is not characterized 
as criminal. In fact, the logic of the duty to prosecute is that it will end 
impunity of individual wrongdoers and promote rule of law. In so 
doing, States may burnish their image as law-abiding nations and the 
determination of their own guilt is not the object of legal investigation 
and justice discourse. 
Nevertheless, unlike international criminal law, under human 
rights law State responsibility attaches to the State’s separate breach 
of its human right obligations that occur in the commission of State-
perpetrated atrocities. In other words, State responsibility attaches for 
a State’s violation of the victims’ substantive human rights 
protections (e.g. prohibition of torture) as well as the State’s failure to 
investigate, prosecute, and punish offenders.103 Human rights 
                                                                                                             
100.  This is not to say the UN treaty system is ineffective and many have chronicled its 
success in spurring changes in state behavior as well as contributing to an international culture 
respectful of human rights and the rule of law. See e.g., PHILIP ALSTON, THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1995). 
101.  These acts may be criminalized in domestic law, like murder, or prosecuted as 
international crimes where states have incorporated such crimes into domestic law, or, in 
theory under principles of universal jurisdiction, which give states the right to prosecute 
certain international crimes. See G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, ¶¶ 3(b), 4, 5 (Dec. 16, 
2005) [hereinafter Basic Principles]. 
102.  U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 5-8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 
23, 2004). 
103. Id. These breaches are of obligations to the individual and not to the international 
community as a whole, which undercuts the normative value of pursuing state responsibility 
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remedies for such violations offer opportunities to address structural 
aspects of the State institutions that enabled the violations in the first 
place. Remedies available to victims include measures of satisfaction 
and guarantees of non-repetition.104 These remedies do important 
work insofar as they address the contributing factors to State abuses 
and generate a jurisprudence regarding the scope of State 
responsibility for State acts that are also international crimes. 
However, their application is inadequate when compared to the scale 
of what is needed to remediate the harm caused by State-sponsored 
mass violence and to eradicate the defects in the State institutions and 
structures responsible. 
International criminal law and human rights law are hampered 
by the normative limitations of dual responsibility to name and 
acknowledge State culpability for acts that constitute international 
crimes and reflect liberalism’s insistence on individual and not 
collective guilt. State legal responsibility for such acts is available 
within human rights, but this recourse reinforces legal accountability 
as individual. The transitional justice movement, which incorporates 
human rights and international criminal law, frames the international 
justice discourse on mass atrocities to exclude State culpability.105 
The next section examines how this state of affairs has come to pass. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
Transitional justice is the dominant normative framework within 
which international accountability for atrocities is discussed. While 
debates within the field have been lively and dynamic, the concept of 
State crimes does not figure in the discussion. More importantly, the 
extent to which State accountability is raised, it emerges as a criticism 
                                                                                                             
for human rights violations as opposed to state responsibility for violations of erga omnes 
obligations. 
104. Satisfaction includes state apologies and other forms of acknowledgment of its 
failure to uphold human rights. Measures of non-repetition include reforms of state institutions 
responsible for the abuses, etc. Dinah Shelton, Reparations, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 28 (2009); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches 
to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351 (2007-08). 
105.  In addition, the liberal frame of the human rights regime, conceived as a regime of 
individual rights realization, places limitations on its ability to fully respond to state 
criminality. Such limitations include the individualized nature of human rights adjudication, 
which places limits on its suitability to address mass violence. 
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of international criminal accountability. Given that international 
criminal accountability is part of a more general movement of 
international justice that incorporates redress for broader social and 
economic marginalization, it is a puzzle that the concept of State 
crimes and State legal responsibility is absent from the discourse. 
State culpability serves the accountability and rule of law agenda that 
has driven the transitional justice field106 and the remedies for State 
breaches could include measures to dismantle State institutions and 
structures that enabled mass violence, which many transitional justice 
advocates argue are necessary components of justice.107 Part of the 
answer lies in the ways that transitional justice has theorized 
accountability. 
The dominant definition of transitional justice is that it refers to 
the “conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes.”108 International criminal 
accountability has emerged as the guiding principle for how 
transitional justice conceives of legal accountability, with the ICC as 
its leading institution. However, international criminal accountability 
is only one tool among many that societies may employ as part of 
transitional justice. Other initiatives include truth commissions, 
vetting or lustration, locally based alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, memorials, etc. While international criminal law and 
transitional justice are related areas of law and practice, their 
relationship has evolved over time and remains subject to heated 
debate. Because transitional justice started out as an accountability 
project and has come to dominate discussions about how societies and 
the international community should respond to mass violence, it is 
important to examine the role of legal accountability in transitional 
justice. 
What does accountability mean, how it is prioritized, and why is 
it important? This Section reviews the development of transitional 
justice and then identifies how the concept of legal accountability 
which includes but is larger than legal responsibility, operates within 
                                                                                                             
106.  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, infra note 124. 
107.  See infra note 211. 
108.  Ruti Teitel, Human Rights in Transition: A Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 
HARV. HUM. RTS J. 69, 70 (2003) [hereinafter Teitel, Human Rights in Transition]. 
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transitional justice discourse.109 This enables us to see how legal 
accountability in transitional justice has come to mean processes that 
lead to criminal responsibility. Those who argue that transitional 
justice should pay greater attention to structural violence and drivers 
of conflict have largely ignored pursuit of States as legally 
accountable actors outside of the human rights regime. Although 
positive law currently excludes penal sanctions against States, 
reconceptualizing international State legal responsibility to 
discursively acknowledge State culpability for mass violence would 
align international remonstration against States with its treatment of 
individuals. It would also invite renewed attention to how existing 
remedies of State responsibility could be applied to reform or to 
dismantle State institutions implicated in the perpetration of 
international crimes. 
This Section begins with a brief review of the origins and 
development of transitional justice as the dominant frame to address 
mass atrocities and repressive regimes. It then turns to characterizing 
three primary strands of transitional justice thinking and how these 
regard international criminal law. As the contours of the debates 
within transitional justice become clear, the Section shifts to a 
discussion of the implications for the state of the field. 
A. Transitional Justice: An Overview 
Transitional justice emerged as a concept in the late 1980s as 
dictatorships in Latin America fell and the breakup of the Soviet 
Union raised the question of how States transitioning to democracy 
should address the past.110 Nuremberg was the legacy that transitional 
justice supporters invoked to legitimate their goals; criminal trials 
were thought to promote deterrence of mass bloodshed, represent the 
triumph of law over violence, and symbolize the commitments of a 
new regime to rule of law, and help consolidate emerging 
democracies.111 
                                                                                                             
109.  Legal responsibility refers to the determination of a breach of an international 
obligation while legal accountability refers to the broader processes by which a breach and 
appropriate legal consequences are determined. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
110.  ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON: PAPERS AND 
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 4-6, 1988 (1989). 
111.  Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the 
“Field” or “Non-Field,” 3 INT. J. TRANS. J. 5, 22 (2009) (“The word ‘justice’ in transitional 
justice and the term’s origins in an attempt to develop legal accountability during transitions to 
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In his opening speech at the Nuremberg trials, Justice Jackson 
linked the liberal (individual) model of accountability with the goals 
of deterrence and peace: “This principle of personal liability is a 
necessary as well as logical one if international law is to render real 
help to the maintenance of peace.”112 The link between criminal 
accountability and peace gained traction and was consistent with the 
policy preferences of early transitional justice proponents. In her 
analysis of the origins of transitional justice in the late 1980s, Paige 
Arthur argues that intellectuals guiding policy in successor regimes in 
Latin America embraced a top-down, institutional reform approach in 
part because alternative theories of democratization had been the 
discredited: Marxism and the socio-economic development theories 
of the 1960s.113 Transitional justice was associated with the goals of 
rule of law, institutional reform to consolidate democracy, deterrence, 
and social reconstruction.114 
However, individual criminal accountability might not always be 
feasible, for example where members or supporters of the former 
regime held sufficient power to threaten the peace should trials 
occur.115 In Eastern Europe, where State abuses were characterized 
not by mass violence but by State surveillance, secrecy, and decades 
of Communist governments that stifled dissent, the preferred policy 
was to open up State archives and purge State bureaucracies of 
                                                                                                             
democracy, have made law’s predominance difficult to disrupt.”); Paige Arthur, How 
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice, 31 
HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 332 (2009). Arthur dates the birth of transitional justice to the 1988 Aspen 
Institute conference and argument by Jaime Malamud-Goti, one of the “chief architects” of 
Argentine president Alfonsin’s prosecution policy, who summarized the thinking at the time as 
follows: “We agreed with the view that trying the perpetrators in the military of the worst 
crimes would contribute to the consolidation of democracy by restoring confidence in its 
mechanism” (citation omitted). See also Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note 108, at 
70. 
112.   Opening Speech, supra note 26. 
113.  Arthur, supra note 111, at 337-38; Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note 
108, 84-85 (“Even as the disparities between rich and poor associated with the free market 
economy have grown, the impetus has been to resort increasingly to the transitional justice 
discourse and a project that is to some extent backward-looking and limited to restoration. 
Presently, the extent to which transitional justice has displaced other justice projects signals 
chastened political expectations responding to the failed experiments of a not so distant past.”). 
114.  Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 57. 
115.  For example, in Argentina, fear of the military led the new government to halt 
further trials after a handful of former members of the military junta had been prosecuted, and 
it passed amnesty laws in 1986 and 1987 that remained in place until 2005. George C. Rogers, 
Argentina’s Obligation to Prosecute Military Officials for Torture, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 259, 262-67 (1989). 
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officials who were implicated in repression.116 Yet criminal 
accountability was the gold standard, and alternatives like truth 
commissions and vetting were second best. 
Initially, truth commissions were hailed as offering a measure of 
state reckoning with the past in situations in which criminal trials 
were not possible.117 Activists supported truth commissions, in part, 
out of the belief that they provided an opportunity for the collection of 
evidence that could be used eventually in criminal prosecutions.118 
South Africa’s choice to forego pursuit of criminal trials and establish 
a truth commission in 1995119 challenged the idea that the pursuit of 
criminal accountability was the highest expression of transitional 
justice. The South African model prioritized truth and reconciliation 
over criminal accountability, in a political bargain justified in terms of 
the country’s cultural values of Ubuntu, and expressed as restorative 
justice.120 The South African example prompted new thinking about 
which transitional justice mechanisms best supported social 
reconstruction. Supporters of truth commissions pointed out that these 
authoritative bodies performed work that fostered some of the goals 
of transitional justice better than criminal trials. Truth commissions 
could examine a wider range of issues than permitted by criminal 
charges, for example the structural dimensions that contributed to the 
bloodshed.121 In addition, they also could offer victims the 
opportunity to narrate their experiences in ways not possible in a 
criminal court, and to recommend measures to foster social and 
political change, including reparations to victims. Many understood 
that criminal trials and truth commissions were not necessarily in a 
binary relationship; they each prioritized different goals and had 
                                                                                                             
116.  UNITED NATIONS, WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? A BACKGROUNDER 1 
(2008), http://www.un.
org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/justice_times_transition/26_02_2008_background_note.pd
f. 
117.  See PRICILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2nd ed. 2010). 
118.  Laurel E. Fletcher, Editorial Note, 9 INT’L. J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1 (2015); 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, at 4-6 in TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE (Naomi Roht-
Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena, eds. 2006) [hereinafter BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE]. 
119.  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.). 
120.  DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999). 
121.   BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 4; MARTHA MINOW, 
BETWEEN JUSTICE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS 
VIOLENCE (1999). 
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distinct roles to play.122 Similarly, in some countries, like Rwanda and 
East Timor, State authorities employed alternatives to criminal trials 
as a means to provide a way for lower-level offenders to make 
amends for their wrongdoing and be accepted back into local 
communities.123 
By 2004, transitional justice practices had proliferated and 
become a widely accepted feature, if not fixture, of international 
policy. The UN Secretary-General released his report “The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies.”124 The title reflects a broadening of temporal span for 
transitional justice mechanisms.125 Indeed, the first ICC indictments 
were issued against Ugandan rebels in an on-going armed conflict.126 
The report endorses a pluralistic approach to mechanisms of 
transitional justice and cautions against “one-size-fits-all formulas.”127 
While the report affirmed a commitment to criminal accountability, 
the ineligibility of amnesties for international crimes, and the rights of 
victims, it also accepted that transitional justice interventions required 
local legitimacy to contribute to peace, stability, and the rule of law. 
The document ratified the essential paradigm and mechanisms of 
                                                                                                             
122.  Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, at 8-13 in BEYOND 
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118. 
123.  See Patrick Burgess, A New Approach to Restorative Justice: East Timor’s 
Community Reconciliation Process, in BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 
176; Timothy Longman, Justice at the Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda, in BEYOND 
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 206. Scholars have also criticized these initiatives 
for not meeting their goals to promote social reconstruction and, in some instances, of 
exacerbating tensions. See also Janine Natalya Clark, Reconciliation through Remembrance? 
War Memorials and the Victims of Vukovar, 7 INT’L J.TRANS. JUST. 116 (2013). 
124.  U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice]. 
125.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established 
during the conflict in the Balkans, and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued its first 
arrest warrants against the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel organization 
operating at that time in northern Uganda and notorious for kidnapping children and attacking 
villages. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, A POISONED CHALICE? LOCAL CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S ENGAGEMENT IN UGANDA (Oct. 
2011) [hereinafter A POISONED CHALICE?]. 
126.  In fact, the issuance of ICC arrest warrants was subject to sharp criticism that the 
court derailed on-going peace negotiations. A POISONED CHALICE?, supra note 125, at 1. 
127.  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124. 
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transitional justice and this framework for policy and intervention has 
not changed significantly.128 
B. Conceptions of Accountability in Transitional Justice 
Thus the question remains: what is the relationship of legal 
processes of accountability to transitional justice? Three strands of 
thought or models for this relationship emerge from the transitional 
justice literature and will be referred to, respectively as “the 
Nuremberg” or “absolutist accountability” model, the “hybrid 
accountability” model, and the “grafted accountability” model. These 
various approaches are loosely chronological, reflecting the evolution 
of thinking on transitional justice over the last 20 years. But these 
strands should not be taken as a precise chronology or historiography 
of the topic as traces of concepts that are dominant in early periods 
appear in later conceptualizations and vice versa. These various 
conceptualizations are intertwined or coexist, rather than being neatly 
segregated along a linear trajectory. Nevertheless, each of these ideas 
has been more prevalent during certain periods over this timespan. 
Moreover, the models outlined below are presented in their idealized 
forms to identify their theorized relationships of accountability to 
transitional justice and thus should not be taken as descriptions of 
their operation. 
The contestation of the proper place for criminal accountability 
in addressing mass atrocity and repression has led to three primary, 
and currently co-existing ideas about the relationship of international 
criminal law to transitional justice. Yet each model eschews state 
legal responsibility, either because understands legal accountability as 
individual criminal responsibility (Nuremberg/absolutist) or because 
it excludes state legal responsibility in favor of victim-centered, or 
process-based initiatives (hybrid and grafted). Hybrid accountability 
and grafted accountability embrace a broader conception of 
accountability beyond individual international criminal accountability 
and do so from a so-called victim-centered approach. This perspective 
views legalism and legal solutions skeptically. These models rely on 
state accountability as a policy goal to promote good governance or, 
as configured by human rights law, as a remedy. These debates also 
                                                                                                             
128.  U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634 (Oct. 12, 2011). 
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obscure the potential that pursuing explicitly an agenda of state legal 
accountability could deliver discursively and, ultimately, practically. 
1. Nuremberg/Absolutist Accountability Model 
As Ruti Teitel observed, the Nuremberg trials reflect the 
“triumph of transitional justice within the scheme of international 
law.”129 Societies would not simply “turn the page” on a violent past, 
they would forthrightly reckon with it through the prism of 
international criminal law. Accountability in the Nuremberg model is 
specifically individual criminal accountability. And this form of legal 
accountability is justified by universal moral and legal principles as 
well as the instrumental goals of supporting peace, democratization, 
and human rights. In other words, accountability is both a means and 
an end to be pursued. Mass violence in an increasingly globalized 
world makes a moral demand on the international community to 
respond not just because bloodshed may threaten world peace, but 
also because such acts are an affront to humanity, a threat to universal 
values. As captured in the Secretary-General’s report on transitional 
justice, the rise of international criminal accountability represents “a 
growing shift in the international community, away from a tolerance 
for impunity and amnesty and towards the creation of an international 
rule of law.”130 
Legal accountability gains considerable traction because positive 
law frames the violence as international crimes, which trigger legal 
obligations of retributive justice. This approach is perhaps most 
clearly laid out in Diane Orentlicher’s 1990 article in the Yale Law 
Journal, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime.”131 At the time of her writing, the state 
duty to investigate and prosecute individuals for perpetrating certain 
international crimes was codified in international humanitarian law as 
grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions, the crime of genocide 
under Genocide Convention, and torture in the UN Convention 
Against Torture.132 These treaty obligations predate the rash of post-
                                                                                                             
129.  Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note 108, at 70. 
130.   Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶ 40. 
131.  Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991). 
132.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Fourth Geneva Convention) art. 50, 51, 130, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (referring 
to grave breaches); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
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Nuremberg international criminal tribunals and courts, and serve as an 
important reminder that individual accountability is embedded in the 
international rule of law framework. 
Nevertheless, the ad hoc criminal tribunals and the ICC have 
supplied an even more elaborate legal articulation of international 
criminal law relative to other interventions. The international criminal 
justice institutions are not outliers within the international system, but 
rather mascots of its transitional justice approach. The UN transitional 
justice policy, numerous statements of principle, and the institutional 
commitments to human rights affirm criminal accountability as a state 
duty and bedrock value.133 Moreover, with the creation of a standing 
international criminal court, justice for Rome Statute violations may 
be pursued during conflict. This development blurs the temporal 
boundaries of transitional justice (justice begins with the violation, 
not with the political transition) and raises the question of whether 
transitional justice and individual criminal accountability fuse as a 
practical matter.134 
The Nuremberg accountability model relies on legal positivism 
to legitimate prosecutions and is associated with those who argue in 
favor of international relations and policy based on adherence to 
principles and rules. The justice supporters or “idealists” argue that 
accountability is not a policy option, but a universal obligation; in 
contrast “realists” hold that justice should not be an absolute value but 
that achieving stability should be the primary goal in ending conflict 
and that there may be prudential reasons to compromise justice to 
achieve peace.135 Thus the international criminal prosecutors have 
defended their pursuit of justice in the face of criticism that doing so 
                                                                                                             
art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
133.  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶¶ 38, 49; Diane Orentlicher 
(Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity), Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights: Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102 (Feb. 18, 2005); G.A. 
Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005); Pablo de Greiff (Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of Non-recurrence), Report of the 
Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/56 (Aug. 27, 2014). 
134.  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶ 2 (noting that the purpose 
of the report is to highlight lessons learned of the UN’s pursuit of justice and rule of law in 
conflict as well as post-conflict situations). 
135.  Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of 
International War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI 345, 346 
(2004). 
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risked igniting conflict136 or jeopardizing ongoing peace 
negotiations.137 
Accountability in this model also is related to the larger goal of 
ending impunity for serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. This goal applies more broadly than 
transitional justice contexts, as such acts do not always occur as part 
of armed conflict or as part of governance by authoritarian regimes. 
Nevertheless, within transitional justice, the absolutist model of 
accountability serves as a principled sword forging calls for criminal 
accountability as well as a shield to block efforts to compromise on 
justice.138 For example, the duty to prosecute serious human rights 
violations may not be defeated by amnesties and so advocates may 
rely on this obligation to expose efforts by governments to justify the 
pursuit of reconciliation or restorative justice models as a cynical 
attempt to evade redress of any kind.139 
Finally, the Nuremberg model of accountability excludes 
collective forms of sanction. Remember that part of the reason the 
Allies decided to criminally prosecute the Nazi leaders was to 
decouple the Nazi regime from the German state and to demonstrate 
                                                                                                             
136.  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Chief Prosecutor, Statement at the ICC on Indictments 
of LRA Commanders During UN-Brokered Peace Negotiations 8 (Oct. 14, 2005), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2919856F-03E0-403F-A1A8-D61D4F350A20/277305/
Uganda_LMO_Speech_141020091.pdf (“The International Criminal Court was established to 
demonstrate the determination of the international community to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes. Civilians in Northern Uganda have been living in a 
nightmare of brutality and violence for more than nineteen years. I believe that, working 
together, we will bring justice, peace and security for the people of Northern Uganda.”). 
137.  For example, ICTY prosecutor Richard J. Goldstone was criticized for indicting 
the self-styled Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic on the eve 
of peace negotiations. INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PURSUING 
JUSTICE IN ONGOING CONFLICT 3 (May 2007). 
138.  Kieran McEvoy, Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a “Thicker” Version of 
Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE 15, 24 (Kiernan McEvoy & Lorna McGregor, ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW] (observing the movement of 
accountability in transitional justice as follows: “In an environment where politically-
constructed notions of ‘pragmatism’ and related offshoots such as reconciliation are often 
viewed as slippery bywords for impunity, ‘human rights as retribution’ provides an 
understandably comforting terra firma for many lawyers.”); Kieran McEvoy & Lorna 
McGregor, Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy and Praxis, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW, at 18-19 [hereinafter McEvoy & McGregor, An 
Agenda for Research]. 
139.  Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts” Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms 
with Local Agency, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 10, 21 (2007); see also Bell, supra note 
111, at 16-17. 
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that the German people as a whole were not on trial.140 The 
Nuremberg theories of collective liability aimed to criminalize 
associations (the Nazi party) and corporations have largely been 
discarded in the 21st Century resurgence of international criminal 
accountability.141 Notwithstanding the Allies’ pursuit of war 
reparations, which from the perspective of the vanquished state have a 
sanctioning character, the legal distinction between exacting 
collective reparations and punishment seems to have held sway in the 
Nuremberg theorization of accountability. Individual criminal 
accountability defines accountability for past wrongs as a matter of 
international law and morality. 
2. Hybrid Accountability Model 
With the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
the goals of transitional justice self-consciously broadened beyond 
pursuit of justice and the role and shape of accountability underwent a 
rethinking in the field.142 The second conceptualization of 
accountability fits within what is termed a ‘holistic’ approach to 
transitional justice. In this framework individual criminal 
accountability is only one of many goals that transitional justice aims 
to accomplish. State responsibility for human rights obligations 
figures as a justification for a victim-centered approach. In the holistic 
model, laid out in the 2004 Secretary-General report, pursuit of justice 
is not necessarily the only or highest goal, but is one that needs to be 
pursued in a balanced way along with truth recovery, reparations for 
victims, preserving the peace, and building democracy and the rule of 
law.143 The oft-quoted tagline from the Secretary-General’s report 
                                                                                                             
140.  See supra note 16. 
141.  Nina H.B. Jorgensen, Criminality of Organizations Under International Law, in 
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 201-02. 
142.  See Bell, supra note 111, at 9, 13-24 (arguing that transitional justice grew to 
cover more than human rights accountability in democratic transitions “to a broader 
conception of transition involving a range of legal regimes and mechanisms, as well as a 
complex set of goals beyond those of ‘accountability’ and ‘democraticization’ . . . “); Pablo de 
Greiff, Theorizing Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NOMOS, vol. LI, 31, 32 
(2012). Teitel identifies this period as phase II in her transitional justice genealogy, in which 
transitional justice is characterized as having an expanded aim of promoting reconciliation and 
thus justice is instrumental to facilitate this desired result. In turn this meant adopting a more 
capacious view of amnesty policies. Teitel, Human Rights in Transition, supra note 108, at 77-
82. 
143.  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 124, ¶ 25; Vinjamuri & Snyder, 
supra note 135, at 352-53 (arguing that realists do not have a principled attachment to justice 
492 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:447 
frames this approach as: “We must learn as well to eschew one-size-
fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, 
base our support on national assessments, national participation, and 
national needs and aspirations.”144 Accountability is valued, but must 
be pursued in an appropriate way, at an appropriate time.145 
Thus the model of accountability associated with holistic 
transitional justice is hybrid accountability: criminal prosecutions are 
understood as legitimate, but non-retributive mechanisms are also 
validated. The choice of interventions will depend on the context. 
Hybrid accountability places criminal responsibility within the 
broader influence of legalism in transitional justice and becomes 
subject to critique as such. There is a line of transitional justice 
scholarship that questions the pursuit of legal accountability as part of 
a larger critique of the hegemonic influence of legalism in the field. 
Adherence to legalism prioritizes the pursuit of legal solutions 
after mass violence blind to the power of political and social contexts. 
Political philosopher Judith Shklar elaborated this concept, drawing 
insights by theorizing law as a faith-based system. She characterized 
the root of this dilemma based on the fact that law as “an ideology [is] 
. . . too inflexible to recognize the enormous potentialities of 
legalism as a creative policy, but exhausts itself in intoning traditional 
pieties and principles which are incapable of realization.”146 For 
Shklar, adherence to legalism required trials at Nuremberg, but the 
real value of prosecutions was not in applying rule of law in the 
abstract but that in so doing, the trials contributed to consolidating 
political and social support in postwar Germany for law rather than 
violence as a tool to resolve social conflict.147 
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In the hybrid accountability model, legalism assumes a more 
negative character. Kieran McEvoy lays out a trenchant analysis of 
the effects of legalism in transitional justice that includes but goes 
beyond pursuit of accountability. Not only does legalism manifest as 
individual criminal accountability, but, with it, the discourse of 
human rights overshadows the contributions of other perspectives to 
solving the complex problems of social reconstruction. Thus, legalism  
lends itself to a “Western-centric” and top-down focus; it self-
presents . . . as apolitical; it includes a capacity to disconnect 
from the real political and social world of transition through a 
process of “magical legalism”; and finally it suggests a 
predominant focus upon retribution as the primary mechanism to 
achieve accountability.148 
A groundswell of criticism of criminal prosecutions emerged 
together with a more general resistance to legal approaches as the 
dominant transitional justice response. Practitioners and researchers 
working with or studying the effects of trials exposed the gaps 
between the promise of international criminal justice and the 
instrumental goals that prosecutions were supposed to achieve: rule of 
law, reconciliation, healing to victims, etc. Studies chronicled 
problems in implementation of justice that had unintended effects, for 
example on victims who participated in proceedings but did not find 
the promised “closure” or healing but rather disappointment.149 
Research also offered a decidedly mixed empirical record as to 
whether trials had a positive effect on reconciliation.150 The empirical 
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evidence buttressed skeptics of individual accountability, many of 
whom advanced alternative visions of transitional justice that re-
centered the enterprise on victims. 
An early advocate of this approach, legal scholar Martha Minow, 
argued for victim-centered approaches to transitional justice and 
understood that processes to foster reckoning with the past should 
look beyond retribution for perpetrators and reframe attention on the 
experience and needs of victims.151 Minow theorized this relationship 
by comparing criminal trials to truth commissions, which reinforced 
seeing these mechanisms as a binary choice between legal 
accountability and its alternatives.152 The holistic framework and 
experiences with how transitional justice mechanisms worked in 
practice tempered this distinction. Supporters of a victim-centered 
approach promoted the idea that all transitional justice mechanisms 
should be responsive to victims’ experiences. Truth commissions, 
often touted as victim-centered, could exclude or devalue the 
experiences of categories of victims, or frame their experiences in 
ways that elided important dimension of their victimization,153 just as 
criminal courts could.154 
Proponents of victim-centered transitional justice frequently rely 
on human rights and other international positive law obligations to 
argue that transitional justice mechanisms should be more responsive 
to a whole range of victims’ demands.155 What adherents to this 
conceptualization gain by this is to foreground the victim within what 
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is largely a State-centered approach to transitional justice by speaking 
the language of the duties of States to individuals.156 Human rights 
treaties generate duties of the States to individuals and in the context 
of transitional justice, these include the duty to generate the truth,157 
investigate, and punish gross human rights violations or serious 
violations of humanitarian law,158 and to provide victims of such acts 
with reparations.159 It is in the area of reparations that proponents of 
victim-centered approaches most visibly rely on the international 
legal standards to ground demands for transitional justice processes to 
compensate victims, although other forms of reparations like 
rehabilitation and institutional reform are also promoted.160 The rise 
of victims’ rights within transitional justice is helped by the 
international justice scheme established by the Rome Statute. The 
ICC elevates attention to victims as right-bearers within international 
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justice, within a legal scheme that incorporates elements of restorative 
justice alongside retributive justice.161 
Thus, Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf noted that adherence to 
accountability as retributive justice occurred simultaneously with a 
commitment to take victims seriously.162 Yet they observe that the 
normative fealty to accountability that grounded transitional justice 
resisted challenges that would seriously displace accountability as the 
driving principle of the field. 
This phase of transitional justice is marked not only by a 
fascination with locality, but also by a return to Nuremberg’s 
international norms against impunity and a UN prohibition against 
granting amnesties for war crimes. Although policymakers and 
scholars now routinely recognize the importance of adapting 
mechanisms of transitional justice to local circumstances, such 
adaptation tends to be conceptualized in ways that do not modify the 
foundational assumptions of transitional justice.163 
The holistic model of transitional justice supports thinking about 
accountability in a hybrid fashion. On the one hand, individual 
criminal accountability remains an accepted fixture, anchored in 
support of legal justice and law as the plumb line for societies 
recovering from violent pasts. On the other hand, the holistic model 
accommodates critics of criminal trials and legalism by expanding 
what transitional justice includes. Yet even with this accommodation, 
legal accountability remains present but in a new guise. Now, through 
the pursuit of victim-centered transitional justice, the shortcomings of 
State-centric and criminal accountability approaches are to be 
addressed within a liberal framework that confers individual rights on 
victims with concomitant duties of States. 
3. Grafted Accountability Model 
A new model of transitional justice is emerging. Although this 
vision of transitional justice, or “transformative justice” as some of its 
proponents have coined it,164 is the least developed, nonetheless its 
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essential contours are legible. This vision of accountability answers 
Shaw’s and Waldorf’s challenges by offering a conception of 
transitional justice based not in individual criminal accountability, or 
primarily western liberal law, but in peacebuilding, restorative justice, 
and development.165 In this third model, accountability is further 
transformed. Accountability features primarily discursively and 
operates to mobilize local, community-based action rather than as a 
judicial enforcement strategy. It is focused on the State rather than on 
individuals and is grafted onto a vision of broad, societal 
transformation. Individual criminal accountability all but falls away, 
and in its place social justice becomes the end goal of transition. The 
hybrid model accepts criminal accountability and legal solutions as 
legitimate, if flawed, initiatives that do some, but not all, of the work 
transitional justice desires. Transformative justice starts from a 
different premise. It looks first and primarily to local priorities and 
processes to drive the form of transitional justice: law and 
international law are not principles to which social responses should 
hew. 
Holding States accountable for the underlying acts of violence, 
through its duty to prosecute individuals, is not the primary focus or 
an acknowledged coterminous goal in transformative justice. In this 
model, transitional justice ceases to be a State-centric project but one 
that is bottom-up, participatory, endogenous, and designed to address 
societal exclusion and marginalization. To some extent, 
transformative justice is the outgrowth of victim-centered transitional 
justice. In this iteration, however, the deployment of human rights 
arguments is a strategic choice, born of opportunity. One gets the 
sense that if non-legal tools could achieve similar ends, human rights 
and law language would be dispensable. Criminal accountability is 
not pursued as a matter of principle or even for its promised 
consequential value as a State-building tool. If criminal accountability 
for past violence emerges as a priority from a participatory and 
consultative process it will be pursued, grafted onto a larger social 
justice agenda. 
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In their article, From Transitional Justice to Transformative 
Justice: A New Agenda for Practice, Paul Gready and Simon Robins 
lay out this new vision of transitional justice, which is an unabashed 
effort to radicalize transitional justice politics and practice.166 While 
they are not the only ones promoting a similar alternative, theirs is a 
full-throated defense and emblematic of this approach. The authors 
argue that transitional justice suffers from its limits as a set of legally 
based, State-centric approaches, which aim to establish a liberal peace 
after times of political violence or repression.167 Universal norms are 
“too remote” and the holistic approach does not allow for truly 
bespoke solutions. There is no mechanism to order priorities among 
various options and attempts to address root causes and socio-
economic inequities are too narrow.168 
Transitional justice praxis cannot break free of these limits 
without offering a substantive critique of “the globally dominant 
practices of which it is a part . . . .”169 The authors do so and seek to 
address these constraints by promoting practices that will support 
what they term transformative justice. They define transformative 
justice as “transformative change that emphasized local agency and 
resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived 
outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power 
relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the 
global level.”170 Thus transformative justice seeks to shift the focus of 
transitional justice from the attention to the legal dimensions of 
transition to the social and political; from the State and its institutions 
to the everyday experiences of residents; and to have change driven 
by a bottom-up understanding and analysis of the lives and needs of 
affected populations.171 Its tools will be broad and beyond trials and 
truth commission to “comprise a range of policies and approaches that 
can impact on the social, political and economic status of a large 
range of stakeholders.”172 
Gready and Robins share with others the push against the 
dominance of criminal accountability for international crimes on the 
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grounds that this approach privileges violations of physical integrity 
(mass killings, torture, rape, etc.) and sidelines systemic violence and 
socio-economic inequities that drive conflict.173 But the authors 
broaden the frame in which they examine criminal accountability, 
asking about its consequences not just for deterrence but also for the 
impact that criminal prosecutions may have on the ability of fragile 
States to deliver services.174 This model’s rejection of legalism allows 
for a reconceptualization of transitional justice. In place of a norm-
driven and pluralist approach to the mechanisms of the holistic model, 
the authors argue for a process-based, deliberative approach to 
determining which mechanisms to adopt. Transformational justice is 
inductive in developing policies and mechanisms, and includes 
communities and affected populations in deliberations about priorities 
and what is needed to redress systemic power imbalances that 
undergird social injustice.175 Transformative justice does not presume 
that application of individual criminal accountability for serious past 
crimes is necessary as a matter of principle or that it will generate 
desired long term change. 
Consistent with a view of transitional justice as participatory and 
reliant on and supportive of civic mobilization, judicial enforcement 
of State accountability to victims as a matter of principle does not 
drive transformative justice in the way that anti-impunity drives the 
absolutist accountability model. Transformative justice draws support 
from scholars who advocate for greater attention to economic 
violence, economic justice, and structural drivers of conflict.176 While 
human rights provide a universal, rights-based vocabulary and 
framework for analysis of these issues, enforcement of the legal 
obligations of the State as such is not always the goal of this model. 
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Generating political pressure for policy reform is the avenue for 
change. Some practitioners and researchers advocate that truth 
commissions, the transitional justice mechanism generally tasked with 
providing an authoritative account of the past violence, should 
provide an explanatory account of how economic injustices 
contributed to the violence and make recommendations for structural 
reforms to cure these systemic defects.177 Similarly, Gready and 
Robins argue that the human rights-based approach to development, 
which is used as a prescriptive guide to a bottom-up process to 
generate policy and practice in this area, should be incorporated as a 
site of transformative justice.178 
This approach is not, strictly speaking, advocating for legal 
incorporation of economic rights as defined by international law.179 It 
is an effort to draw attention and generate political support to attack 
systemic inequalities in transitional justice contexts. This human 
rights discourse is one used to diagnose and redress economic 
violence. It possesses a rights-based sensibility and adopts a more 
expansive understanding of “justice” than that defined by criminal 
accountability. Here the concept of State accountability is not figured 
as legal accountability for human rights obligations but as political 
and moral accountability, in the sense of democratic political theory 
that understands States as accountable to their citizens for securing 
their welfare. 
However, legal accountability is not wholly absent in this grafted 
model of accountability. It presents itself primarily in calls for 
reparations. Transformative justice overlaps with victim-centered 
approaches to transitional justice in that both justify reparations for 
victims by appeals to human rights law and the duty of the State to 
provide an effective and adequate remedy.180 However, 
transformative justice finds unsatisfactory the legal remedy of 
restitution to victims, which is the most common form of 
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reparations.181 Narrowly prescribed for selective violations and 
designed to restore the victim to her status quo ante, restitution as a 
legal remedy is a relatively anemic form of economic justice. 
Nevertheless, scholars argue that grassroots mobilization of victims 
around demands for reparations serves other important goals that 
support a broader social justice agenda including community 
empowerment, rights conscientization, and strengthening grassroots 
capacity to disrupt power imbalances.182 
Transformative justice offers a wholesale reconfiguration of 
transitional justice practice that is process driven rather than norm 
driven. Aimed at addressing root causes of the violence, social 
marginalization, and fostering social justice, law and legal solutions 
are not presumed to provide the answers to achieving these goals. 
Criminal accountability is balanced not against peace, but against the 
capacity of the State to ensure the welfare of its citizens. Trials still 
may be a tolerated component of transformative justice, but certainly 
not a mainstay. Empowerment of subordinated groups is prioritized 
with the focus on the future and building a more just society rather 
than looking back at the past armed with retributive justice to settle 
accounts. State accountability is also future-focused and largely 
framed in the register of political theory of democratic government 
rather than enforcement of human rights obligations. In other words, 
unlike with the Nuremberg model, legal accountability is sidelined 
and no longer central to the transitional justice project. 
C. Implications of Transitional Justice Models of Accountability for 
State Accountability 
Transitional justice has constituted its views of accountability in 
ways that exclude State criminality and have a limited understanding 
of state accountability. The Nuremberg model is premised on the 
rejection of state crimes and collective punishment. Those trials 
served to identify the individual decision makers responsible for mass 
violence and their guilt was hypothesized to liberate the German 
people from the stigma of their former Nazi leaders. The liberal 
discourse of the Nuremberg Principles omits war reparations and the 
other interventions the Allies imposed on the German collective (e.g. 
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economic and political restructuring) that functioned as stigmatization 
or sanctioning of the State. Liberal accountability prevailed and 
became imbricated with building rule of law and democracy in post-
conflict societies. Legalism so configured muzzles law’s power to 
discipline states for their distinct role in mass violence. 
Hybrid accountability imports the Nuremberg model but 
expands the accepted goals and mechanisms to achieve transitional 
justice to include non-retributive aims. The constraint or elision of 
State sanctions for international crimes carries forward and the 
holistic approach does not include any interventions to hold the State 
legally accountable for mass crimes. The emphasis on victims, 
prevalent in hybrid and grafted accountability, makes room for State 
legal accountability insofar as it justifies reparations based on human 
rights obligations. So why are reparations for human rights violations 
and acknowledgment of State crimes, for which the imposition of 
reparations could be as a consequence, not the same thing? 
1. Human Rights Effaces State Responsibility to the International 
Community 
There is a normative distinction between State responsibility for 
human rights violations and State responsibility for violations erga 
omnes. The explicit shaming function of identifying the behavior of 
the State as wrongful is missing from human rights reparations. 
Analogous to the distinction in municipal law between criminal law 
and civil law, actions to sanction the State for its role in the 
commission of mass violence through human rights reparations 
misses the moral opprobrium of penal sanctions. It is the lack of a 
normative link between state conduct regarded as penal and 
reparations that dilutes the power of reparations to instantiate a more 
robust, universal value of accountability. Thus, the distinction 
between the imposition of reparations as the result of action 
characterized as State criminality versus human rights violations is 
important. Additionally, although human rights principles influence 
and may be incorporated into transitional justice thinking and 
policies, these largely remain separate spheres of intellectual activity 
and practice. The hybrid model borrows from human rights to the 
extent that human rights principles supports victims’ rights, but is not 
interested in developing the legal remedies of State responsibility 
further as a practice to vindicate the interests of the international 
community. 
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Moreover, the move in transitional justice toward a victim-
centered approach undermines attention to State criminality. In the 
holistic model, scholars and practitioners identify and offer curative 
fixes to address the shortcomings in how transitional justice processes 
address the concerns and experiences of victims. At the same time, 
the expanded goals of transitional justice to promote truth recovery 
and social reconciliation are intertwined with victim-centeredness. 
This reformist agenda largely accepts the transitional justice toolkit 
but proposes ways that any particular initiative can better satisfy 
victims. Thinking within the field that questions the appropriate role 
and relationship of transitional justice to criminal accountability 
pushes in the direction of attending to the individual and community 
and away from the State. The reformist tendencies reject norms, 
legalism, and a focus on States, overlooking what revisiting State 
criminality might offer to the field. While this approach does not 
necessarily—and certainly not explicitly—absolve the State of its 
wrongdoings, it does not examine the contribution that State legal 
responsibility could make to achieve desired change. In questioning 
individual criminal responsibility, a revisiting of State accountability 
and the role for legal responsibility is certainly necessary. 
2. Human Rights Effaces Remedies for State Violations of Duties to 
the International Community 
Those writing in the field critique legalism but argue that 
transitional justice should address the underlying causes of injustice 
that produced the violence. They have a somewhat ambivalent 
relationship to State accountability and State criminality. 
Transformative justice looks to communities and individuals to 
overcome the State-centric foundation of transitional justice. It is not 
concerned with State criminality. More attractive is the human rights 
framework, with its inclusion of participatory rights and substantive 
protections, which offers a discursive lens that makes visible and 
offers a framework to address structural violence. But the rights-based 
approach in this area tends toward policy advocacy and political 
mobilization and away from legal enforcement. This means that a 
human rights perspective on economic harms can inform the work of 
top-down mechanisms like truth commissions or community-based 
interventions as policy guidance. But “hard” legal accountability of 
the State figures only at the periphery. Scholars note that transitional 
justice mechanisms, even when they frame economic injustice in 
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terms violations of human rights, do not carry through on their 
analysis by calling for legal remedies like individual or collective 
reparations or structural reforms.183 
Human rights establish remedies to victims. Yet victims do not 
have universal opportunities to pursue judicial enforcement of 
remedies for conflict-related human rights violations. There is no 
international human rights court comparable to the ICC in which 
victims might assert their rights—both civil and political rights as 
well as economic and social rights—that States violate in perpetrating 
mass violence. Even where human rights law provides for structural 
remedies for human rights violations as a form of reparations called 
“guarantees of non-repetition,” human rights courts have ordered 
these comparatively rarely.184 Moreover, even the more muscular 
forms of structural remedies ordered by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights are weaker than the wholesale State reforms of the 
Potsdam Agreement.185 To be clear, these are important differences of 
practice rather than law; international principles allow for structural 
remedies to prevent recurrence of State-perpetrated atrocities.186 But 
transitional justice’s theorization of remedies as human rights 
violations shortchanges the power of international law. Remedies for 
State violation of obligations owed to the international community 
would arguably justify stronger measures than those drawn from 
human rights practice. Moreover, enforcing remedies for erga omnes 
violations align with the normative rule of law values of the 
international community. Despite the call by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on transitional justice for States to apply human rights 
norms to craft policies that will address structures of marginalization 
as part of transitional justice policy, enforcement of State 
responsibility for perpetrating conflict crimes is an underdeveloped 
area in transitional justice.187 
In short, although accountability and the drive against impunity 
for serious human rights violations and violations of international 
                                                                                                             
183.  Schmid & Nolan, supra note 179, at 376; Amanda Cahill-Ripley, Foregrounding 
Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice: Realising Justice for Violations of Economic 
and Social Rights, 32 NETH. Q.HUM. RTS. 183, 186, 207 (2014). 
184.  Gready & Robins, supra note 164, at 347. Yet transitional justice scholars who 
argue for greater attention to addressing economic injustice in general do not justify these 
claims on human rights obligations. See Sharp, supra note 165, at 171. 
185.  Antkowiak, supra note 104, at 351. 
186.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
187.  de Greiff Report, supra note 22. 
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humanitarian law remain central to the field of transitional justice, the 
contestation and debates over the relationship of accountability to the 
goals of the transitional justice has generated particular dynamics. 
Among the three models of transitional justice, legal accountability is 
associated with individual criminal accountability and rises and falls 
with support for state-focused solutions. Evolution of the field has 
generated alternatives to the Nuremberg model of an absolutist, 
principled, application of international criminal accountability. But 
neither the hybrid nor the grafted model lends itself to considering 
State criminality. Attention to victims has entailed sharp critique of 
top-down approaches, which draws attention away from the State as 
legally responsible for redressing mass violence. 
Despite tendencies away from state-centric and legal solutions, 
transitional justice rests within the international, State-centric, world 
order. The push toward victims and grounded solutions apparent in 
the hybrid and grafted accountability models arises in the context of 
State-generated international law and policy. This leads to questions 
about the implications of turning our backs on the State as a focal 
point of accountability when we look to formulating approaches to 
restoring a full measure of justice in the face of mass atrocities. To 
investigate this issue, the next Section examines current approaches 
among international law scholars to state accountability for mass 
violence. What can we glean from how scholars and States conceive 
of State legal accountability and the role of the State in committing 
atrocity crimes? 
III. TOWARD STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MASS VIOLENCE 
We return briefly to reconsider the opening frame of this Article: 
the Security Council vote defeating the proposed referral of the 
situation in Syria. An ICC referral encapsulates the absolutist 
accountability model: the available evidence suggests the Assad 
regime is carrying out widespread and lethal persecution of civilians, 
which constitute crimes in international law, and those responsible 
should be brought to justice.188 At the same time, the systematic and 
organized nature of the violence points to the involvement of organs 
of the State in the commission of these crimes. The armed forces 
likely are the most visible, but civilian branches responsible for 
governance, administration, and enforcement (or lack thereof) of State 
                                                                                                             
188.  Supra note 1. 
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protection of residents also are implicated in furthering the State’s 
persecutory policy against (perceived) political opponents and their 
(perceived) supporters. The proposed referral makes no mention of 
legal measures against the State for its role in perpetrating mass 
violence.189 This should concern us. For the elision of State legal 
responsibility for mass violence means nothing less than State 
impunity for acts that are considered criminal under international law. 
The rule of law values of the international legal order are undermined 
and the legitimacy of its institutions weakened by their glaring failure 
to address the legal responsibility of its most consequential actors.190 
This Section considers this State of affairs and asks what can be 
done to bring international attention and action on legal accountability 
for State propagation of mass violence. This exercise serves as an 
invitation to transitional justice scholars and practitioners to consider 
the value of legalism to advance State, as opposed to individual, 
accountability. This Article does not propose a mechanism for 
enforcement of State responsibility. Rather, it uses the Security 
Council’s treatment of dual responsibility in the case of atrocities 
committed in Sudan to illustrate how the prevailing theories of 
accountability operate and how the Security Council as one 
international institution could advance state legal responsibility. 
This analysis suggests that the theorization of legal 
accountability in transitional justice undercuts State accountability. 
Legal accountability for State atrocities poses a challenge to the 
absolutist accountability model by insisting that there is a collective 
dimension to international crimes that the law should not ignore. At 
the same time, deployment of international law to promote State 
accountability challenges the hybrid and grafted accountability 
models of transitional justice. To the extent that these two models 
reject legalism for its inability to address structural dimensions of 
mass violence, State responsibility offers a fuller legal response than 
either of these models contemplates. Given the weak level of 
development and enforcement of the international law of State 
                                                                                                             
189.  Rep. of the S.C., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (2014) (“condemn[ing]” Syrian 
authorities’ “widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” and 
“urg[ing] all States . . . to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor”). 
190.  See Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Complementarity Between State 
Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: The Crime 
of State Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY 253, 269 (Maurizio Ragazzi 
ed. 2005). 
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responsibility,191 the argument advanced here is that international law 
regarding the responsibility of States for mass violence should be 
cultivated by transitional justice for its conceptual and rhetorical 
value. Doing so has the potential to change the international politics 
surrounding debates on international accountability for mass violence. 
The past 25 years have shown the power of international justice 
discourse to change international responses to mass violence. 
Expanding the discourse to including State accountability could lead 
to a more integrated theory and enforcement strategy of dual 
responsibility for atrocities. 
This Section proceeds as follows: First, international law 
scholarship regarding the law of state responsibility for State crimes is 
mined for its conceptual contributions to advancing State 
accountability for these acts, namely acknowledgement of State 
criminality within international law, thinking about appropriate 
remedies for State crimes, and illustrating the problem of 
enforcement. Second, the effects of the status quo are outlined in an 
effort to juxtapose the costs of today’s equilibrium against the need to 
revise current thinking. Finally, the Section considers how transitional 
justice might incorporate state accountability for mass violence into 
its agenda. 
A. The Contribution of International Law Scholarship to State 
Accountability for Mass Violence 
International legal scholars have studied the problem of mass 
violence from the perspective of the legal responsibilities of States, as 
opposed to the legal responsibilities of individuals. In so doing, they 
offer transitional justice a set of ideas regarding legal accountability 
that the field has not adequately considered. Mass violence creates a 
dilemma in international law, of which its difficulty to address State 
involvement in such horrors is, perhaps, its most visible symptom. 
Nuremberg rejected collective guilt. Nevertheless, as an empirical 
matter, the apparatus of the State will be utilized in the commission of 
State-perpetrated mass violence. Under the concept of “dual 
responsibility,” States may be legally responsible for such crimes and 
their legal responsibility is distinct from criminal sanctions against 
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individuals for their role in the same events.192 This legal 
responsibility of States is not of a penal nature as technically States do 
not commit crimes.193 Making system criminality more difficult to 
address is the fact that although the international law of State 
responsibility establishes rules to determine breaches and the legal 
consequences of these act, the processes of enforcement—a system of 
legal accountability—are underdeveloped.194 Transitional justice 
drove the momentum to establish mechanisms of accountability for 
international criminal law, but has not incorporated calls for State 
legal accountability. Many international law scholars have 
acknowledged this state of affairs as a shortcoming of positivist law 
and have offered conceptual contributions that deepen an 
understanding of the nature of this gap as well as ideas for reform.195 
Andre Nollkaemper develops the idea of system criminality to 
capture “the phenomenon that international crimes—notably crimes 
against humanity, genocide and war crimes—are often caused by 
collective entities in which the individual authors of these acts are 
embedded.”196 He shares with others a concern that the “current 
fashionable focus”197 on international criminal law neglects that for 
most international crimes, either by definition (crimes of 
aggression)198 or as a practical matter,199 the State is directly involved 
                                                                                                             
192.  Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 116, ¶ 173 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter ICJ 
Genocide Case]. 
193.  Id. ¶ 170; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on Request of Rep. of Croatia for 
Review of Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997) (“Under present international law it is clear that States, by 
definition, cannot be the subject of criminal sanctions akin to those provided for in national 
criminal systems.”). 
194.  Outside of Genocide Convention, and the Geneva Conventions, there is no treaty 
law regarding state accountability for international crimes. These treaties are multi-lateral, 
relying on the state that suffered the injury to pursue a remedy and thus do not develop a law 
or practice for violations of ergo omnes obligations. 
195.  See generally SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6. 
196.  Id. at 1. 
197.  Andre Nollkaemper & Harmen Van Der Wilt, Conclusions and Outlook, in 
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 338. 
198.  ICC, Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression (June 11, 2010). 
199.  SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 4 (“when [state authorities] have a 
powerful apparatus at their disposal charged with protecting the security of the state, and when 
they have identified groups that are defined as enemies of the state, collective entities 
themselves can turn into actors that commit, or further the commission of, international 
crimes”); Nigel D. White, Responses of Political Organs to Crimes by States, in SYSTEM 
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in their commission.200 And as a normative as well as instrumental 
matter, States should be held to account for their actions, including 
being punished for breaching established norms.201 The work of these 
scholars prompts an important discussion about how and under what 
conditions international State legal accountability addresses system 
criminality and its relationship to international criminal law. 
However, these debates are largely confined to discussions among 
international law and international criminal law scholars.202 
Transitional justice scholars, even those who are most concerned with 
a holistic approach to reconstruction after mass violence, are not 
considering the contribution of State responsibility.203 Thus the 
differentiated development of the relevant branches of international 
law is mirrored in transitional justice. Cross-fertilization—or more 
precisely, integrating international law into transitional justice—
yields new insights into the nature of the accountability gap and the 
way in which transitional justice contributes to it. What international 
law adds is a legal (as opposed to political) understanding of State 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility as 
complementary systems, both of which are needed to promote a fuller 
measure of accountability for atrocity crimes.204 Transitional justice 
has focused on legal accountability for individuals and needs to 
consider what State responsibility offers both as a normative and 
practical matter. 
                                                                                                             
CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 315; System Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 
2, at 314-17. 
200.  G.P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem 
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201.  Gerry Simpson, Men and Abstract Entities: Individual Responsibility and 
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recent System Criminality edited volume. SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6. 
203.  See infra Part II. 
204.  System Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 337 (2010) (citing 
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hold other states accountable for human rights violations). 
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1. The Normative Contribution of State Responsibility to Transitional 
Justice 
From the perspective of transitional justice, international law 
scholars have addressed two aspects of particular interest: (1) the 
conceptualization of State responsibility and (2) concomitant 
international law remedies that address the underlying or systemic 
drivers of mass violence. The Draft Articles of State Responsibility 
recognize guarantees of non-repetition and measures of satisfaction as 
some of the legal consequences for States that breach international 
obligations.205 Scholars have observed that such measures afford the 
opportunity to advance as a normative, if not as a formal legal matter, 
state culpability for atrocity crimes.206 For example Antonio Cançado 
Trindade has argued that non-pecuniary obligations like reforming 
police or the judiciary “can be regarded as being endowed with a 
character at a time compensatory and punitive (containing elements of 
both a civil and a penal nature).”207 Andrea Gattini, looking at 
historical practices of guarantees of non-repetition, argues that the 
demilitarization and redrawing of national territory of Germany 
technically may be guarantees of non-repetition (and therefore non-
punitive and forward looking) but their very imposition suggests State 
criminality. In other words, why else would the Allies have imposed 
such measures if not because of the Nazi horrors were of such an 
egregious nature as to justify these severe consequences?208 Thus the 
remedies for State responsibility, in particular guarantees of non-
repetition, convey the moral opprobrium against States akin to the 
penal sanction of individual international criminal responsibility. 
                                                                                                             
205.   Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 80, arts. 30 (b) and 34; see 
Andreas Zimmermann & Michael Teichmann, State Responsibility for International Crimes, in 
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a state should have to be imprisoned for many years, whilst leaving in place the structures that 
made possible and facilitated his acts.”). 
207.  Cançado Trindade, supra note 190, at 266; see also Systemic Effects of 
International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 341. 
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Responsibility and Back, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 101; see also Systemic 
Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 343. 
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The fusion of international normative judgment with consequent 
remedies for system criminality offered by pursuit of State 
responsibility for atrocity crimes furthers the aims of transitional 
justice in important conceptual and practical ways. Accountability for 
international crimes is a bedrock international principle around which 
the United Nations has organized international transitional justice 
policy.209 Rule of law ideals—that no one should be above the law—
have thoroughly infused the international justice discourse. Yet 
international rule of law ideals apply equally to States. In fact, 
international rule of law is arguably the organizing principle of the 
postwar international legal system. So when, in the name of 
accountability for international crimes, transitional justice effectively 
ignores State legal responsibility, transitional justice undermines the 
international commitment to rule of law. 
In the case of dual responsibility, States commit not just 
wrongful acts, but violate norms of the highest order—genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes—and obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole. Such transgressions deserve to 
be acknowledged as such. State-perpetrated mass slaughter of 
civilians is conducted in furtherance of a State policy, and relies on 
multiple collective dimensions of the State to advance this criminal 
pursuit. To the extent that transitional justice pursues international 
criminal sanctions, these acts when carried out by States also should 
be identified as wrongs, and offending States should be held 
accountable.210 Further, the symbolic value of international justice for 
mass atrocities should not be underestimated: it is an international 
legal acknowledgment of wrongdoing and an enactment of the 
international commitment to rule of law and justice. Instead of 
pursuing State legal responsibility, transitional justice pursues legal 
justice as accountability for individual crimes. The final version of the 
Draft Articles, while stripped of formal acknowledgment of State 
crimes, leaves a normative and legal framework upon which 
transitional justice can build. 
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2. The Remedial Contribution of State Responsibility to Transitional 
Justice 
In addition to the normative importance of promoting State 
accountability, the international law on State responsibility offers 
transitional justice a legal basis to pursue remedies advocates have 
argued need to be secured to ensure victims a full measure of justice 
and post-conflict societies a sustainable peace. Remedies for State 
violations of international obligations include compensation and 
guarantees of non-repetition. The legal obligation of States to provide 
compensation to victims of atrocity crimes has received considerable 
attention from transitional justice advocates211 and dovetails 
developments in human rights norms that advance enforcement of 
individual rights.212 The remedy of compensation, however, does not 
attend to the collective dimensions of the State that furthered atrocity 
crimes. 
Guarantees of non-repetition are forward-looking remedies, 
which can include measures that dismantle State institutions, laws, 
and systems that contribute to and make it possible for the State to 
institute mass violence. However, as developed in the postwar 
international legal order, the types of measures international judicial 
bodies have ordered bear little resemblance to the far-reaching 
political, legal, and economic reforms that the Allies imposed on 
Germany and Japan. The International Court of Justice has ordered 
guarantees of non-repetition rarely213 and its practice in this regard 
pales in comparison to that developed by human rights courts, notably 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Human rights norms 
offer a legal source for the types of measures that could be used in an 
interstate context to address collective dimensions of mass violence, 
for example, measures to promote public memory of the victims,214 
reform laws to prevent military jurisdiction over civilians,215 but these 
have not been used in the judicial resolution of interstate disputes.216 
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The consensus among international law experts is that the law and 
practice of State responsibility is underdeveloped in this regard.217 
But the postwar practice in this regard should not define the 
parameters for the ways in which guarantees of non-repetition can be 
used as a remedy for system criminality. UN Special Rapporteur on 
transitional justice Pablo de Greiff, the top UN expert advancing 
international transitional justice law and policy, incorporates this 
remedy as one of the four pillars of transitional justice.218 De Greiff 
proposes a range of measures that States should pursue to address 
system criminality that has produced mass violence including, 
ratification of human rights treaties and treaties pertinent to serious 
violations of humanitarian law; domestic legal reforms to criminalize 
offenses of international criminal law; judicial reforms to promote an 
independent and effective judiciary; and, constitutional reforms 
necessary to promote individual rights, prohibit discrimination, 
advance civilian control of the armed forces, and ensure separation of 
powers.219 Of these, the constitutional reforms are the most ambitious 
proposals and in these one sees the echoes of measures imposed on 
Germany. The Allies’ immediate aims were to dismantle the 
discriminatory laws of the Nazi regime, revamp the judicial system, 
and reestablish a representative democracy.220 Similarly, De Greiff 
recommends States strike down discriminatory laws, adopt bills of 
rights, and limit excessive executive powers.221 
We see in both examples an attention to remedy the what, how, 
and why of system criminality. Discriminatory laws create and 
entrench disparate treatment, fueling social unrest; weak judiciaries 
mean that residents cannot seek enforcement of rights; and abuse of 
power by other branches of the State or the unchecked power of 
criminal enterprises facilitate systemic abuse and State policies of 
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violent persecution. Thus, reversing constituent aspects of system 
criminality serves to (re)create the institutional conditions for social 
justice and respect of human rights. These are vital components and 
goals of transitional justice. More to the point, these are remedies that 
international criminal justice and international human rights 
mechanisms cannot provide.222 
3. Evaluation of International Transitional Justice Remedies: Law 
Versus Policy 
The Special Rapporteur’s focus on guarantees of non-repetition 
draws attention to the aspects of the transitional justice agenda that 
seek to remedy “root and branch” problems that contribute to mass 
violence and hamper peace. However, the expert proposal is cast as 
one of policy, not law, and relies on human rights rather than 
international (interstate) law practice and principles to advance its 
claims.223 States are being asked to adopt systemic interventions to 
prevent recurrence of mass violations, but international law and 
commitments to rule of law arguably requires them to do so. Leaving 
aside consideration of whether law or policy is the better tool, the 
relevant question for this inquiry is what does it mean for transitional 
justice to omit the international law of State responsibility? 
One effect is that human rights law and mechanisms are used as 
the examples and conceptual building blocks for transitional justice 
policy in this area. Caution is warranted. Human rights law is being 
asked to address collective dimensions of State-sponsored violence 
through a system designed for another purpose: protection of 
individual rights. Despite broad interpretations of the human rights 
duties of the state to effect a system of governance so that it is capable 
of “juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human 
rights,”224 this is not universally accepted, let alone elaborated with 
regard to dual responsibility. Additionally, in many parts of the world 
victims do not have access to an international judicial enforcement 
mechanism for human rights, even if this branch of international law 
and practice were to become the universal site for redress of mass 
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violence.225 Regional human rights mechanisms play a vital role in 
norm diffusion with regard to state duties to prosecute international 
crimes,226 yet there are other important considerations that militate in 
favor of keeping the development and enforcement of state remedies 
for mass violence outside of the human rights system. 
4. Location and Enforcement of State Responsibility 
Where should transitional justice law and policy be located 
within the international system? In the main, transitional justice 
scholars and advocates focus on the discursive and legal spaces of 
international justice rather than on human rights. The international 
community as a whole acts through the ICC Prosecutor to enforce 
international criminal law. Similarly, as a normative matter, violations 
of State obligations owed to the international community as a whole 
should not depend on enforcement by individual victims within the 
human rights system, but should be enforced on behalf of the 
international system. As a practical matter, leaving enforcement of 
State responsibility for system criminality to human rights 
mechanisms further bifurcates dual responsibility into separate legal 
and institutional spheres. To the extent that the human rights regime, 
with the individual as the subject, is understood to be an exception to 
international law of interstate relations, transitional justice risks losing 
some of its potency by investing in human rights to address what is 
fundamentally an international law problem. 
This raises the larger issue of enforcement mechanisms for State 
system criminality. While this Article does not advance a prescription 
in this regard, a few observations are in order to provide context for 
the conceptual contribution that State accountability can offer 
transitional justice. Simply put, under the current international 
structure, there is no juridical mechanism to hold States legally 
accountable to the international community for system criminality.227 
                                                                                                             
225.  The Inter-American system has the most developed practice with regard to 
ordering measures of non-repetition. There is no regional human rights mechanism for Asia 
through which individuals may petition for judicial relief, and the African system is regarded 
as weak relative to the European and Inter-American systems. See Thomas Buergenthal, The 
Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J.INT’L L. 783, 800 (2006). 
226.  See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING THE WORLD (2011). 
227.  While there is an overlap between serious breaches of human rights obligations 
and state violations of erga omnes obligations and violations of humanitarian law, the 
interstate system of enforcement for international human rights treaty bodies is one of 
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The system is a product of the power and preferences of States to 
maintain sovereign equality and to address State involvement in mass 
violence through political organs, with the Security Council being the 
most powerful actor.228 Although the Security Counsel possesses a 
variety of tools to address State violence,229 its overarching purpose is 
to maintain peace not to impose international legal accountability. 
However, as scholars have noted, the Security Council does make 
legal determinations of international responsibility of States for their 
involvement in atrocity crimes and acts against States pursuant to its 
powers to respond to threats to international peace and security.230 For 
example, the Security Council authorized military action against Iraq 
for its invasion of Kuwait and subsequently created a claims tribunal 
for Iraq to compensate injured parties for their losses.231 And under 
                                                                                                             
reporting and monitoring; the compliance system is more “nuanced” and not based on 
“wrongfulness” as is state responsibility. Brunée, supra note 11, at 51-52. “Nonetheless, once 
a state is subject to the [interstate human rights treaty] system, a degree of accountability is 
generated by publicly measures the state party’s conduct against the international standard, and 
by the attendant pressure on it to comply.” Id. at 49; see also Systemic Effects of International 
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 347 (noting that the practical effect of the law of state 
responsibility is limited by “legal power of courts to give effect to the law” and therefore 
political organs at international and regional levels will have a dominant role in 
implementation). 
228.  Nollkaemper & van der Wilt, supra note 197, at 338 (arguing that an 
accountability system for state criminality would require a different international system and 
offering suggestions for reform); Ian Scobbie, Assumptions and Presuppositions: State 
Responsibility for System Crimes, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 296; White, supra 
note 199, at 317; Brunée, supra note 11, at 55. 
229.  White, supra note 199; Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 
2, at 336-49. The Security Council, after determining there has been a threat to peace, may 
demand the offending state cease its behavior, impose sanctions, demand non-forcible 
measures like disarming militias, refer the situation to the ICC, in addition to authorizing 
military intervention. White, supra note 199, at 323. 
230. Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 349 (noting that 
the Security Council often combines determinations of a threat to the peace with determination 
of a breach of an obligation. Such findings provide the basis for legal sanctions that are similar 
to consequences of state responsibility); Simpson, supra note 201, at 85. 
231.  White, supra note 199, at 318 (observing that the security council also has 
considerable powers under Chapter VII and distinct from any overlap with law of state 
responsibility to address state crimes including to impose sanctions, take military action, 
establish international tribunals or compensation commissions, target individuals, or “more 
controversially promulgate international legislation binding on all states.”). Nollkaemper notes 
several measures the Security Council has taken as a consequence of determining that 
international crimes have been committed involving wrongful acts by states that resemble 
human rights measures of non-repetition including calling for the invalidity of laws that 
provide the conditions for international crimes; demobilization and reintegration of members 
of armed forces; restructuring of security forces; military training in human rights standards, 
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the Rome Treaty, the Security Council plays a role in the enforcement 
of international criminal justice.232 Thus the Security Council serves 
an as example to explore how the international system might take up 
State accountability for atrocity crimes.233 
B. The Disappearance of State Accountability in UN Security Council 
Referrals 
The imposition of international individual criminal 
accountability is rightly considered a testament to the strength of 
international accountability and anti-impunity as a set of normative 
commitments capable of galvanizing international action. The 
Security Council referrals of the situations in Darfur and Libya, 
respectively, to the ICC are examples of this phenomenon.234 These 
actions should be understood as part of the resurgence of international 
criminal accountability from its origins at Nuremberg. Yet in its 
current incarnation, individual criminal responsibility is untethered 
from consideration of State accountability. In fact, State legal 
accountability virtually disappears from consideration. While not 
undermining the significance of the ICC, it is important to probe what 
this lacuna means for the international rule of law and for how the 
international community of nations responds to State crimes. One 
question that the neglect of international State accountability raises is 
whether international criminal accountability is a mere distraction or 
decoy drawing attention away from addressing the role of States in 
perpetrating atrocity crimes and in maintaining structures that may 
threaten peace, even after responsible leaders have been prosecuted in 
The Hague. 
                                                                                                             
and developing capacities of police forces and strengthening of the judicial system. Systemic 
Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 351. 
232.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b). 
233.  There are good reasons to be skeptical of the ability of the Security Council to 
serve as an effective enforcement mechanism for state responsibility. Scholars concede that 
while the Council has the authority to adopt a more robust approach to international state 
accountability, the political power dynamics of this body create obstacles to change. White, 
supra note 199, at 316 (arguing that the horizontal and consensual nature of international law 
impeded states’ ability to confront state crimes effectively). 
234.  See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6491st mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26, 
2011); U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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1. Finding but Not Acting on State Responsibility 
The Security Council referrals of Sudan and Libya to the ICC 
illustrate the theory of international accountability for mass violence 
as one of individual criminal responsibility exclusive of actions to 
hold the state legally accountable. In each case, the Security Council 
predicated its referral on findings that state authorities were involved 
in gross human rights abuses and violations of international 
humanitarian law.235 This legal determination ineluctably led to the 
need to impose individual criminal sanctions. The logic operating is 
that “accountability” and an end to “impunity” are necessary as 
normative matters to promote justice as well serve instrumental aims 
of achieving peace and reconciliation.236 Although the role of the state 
in perpetrating atrocities is an explicit basis for the referrals, the only 
legal consequence the Security Council imposed on the offending 
states was to seek an ICC prosecution of responsible individuals.237 
The French proposal for a Security Council referral for Syria similarly 
contemplated only individual criminal sanctions.238 
In the case of Sudan, the International Commission of Inquiry,239 
which preceded the Security Council referral, recommended that the 
                                                                                                             
235.  S.C. Res. 1593, pmbl. (Mar. 31, 2005) (based on Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of 
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (2005) Pursuant to Resolution 1564 
(2004) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 determining the government of Sudan and the Janajweed as 
responsible for international crimes [hereinafter ICID Report]); S.C. Res. 1970 pmbl. (Feb. 26, 
2011). 
236.  Both referrals are based on the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers to protect 
threats to international peace and security and the Security Council meeting discussions reflect 
the views of state representatives that call for criminal accountability for perpetrators to 
strengthen peace and security. See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6491st mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26, 2011); U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 
(Mar. 31, 2005) (reflecting the views of state representatives that call for criminal 
accountability for perpetrators to strengthen peace and security during Security Council 
meeting discussions when using Chapter VII powers). 
237. The Security Council includes other state-centric actions—its Sudan referral 
includes a recommendation for the creation of restorative justice mechanisms and its Libyan 
referral includes an arms embargo and travel ban. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 235, ¶5 (also 
recommending to Sudan the creation of restorative justice mechanisms); S.C. Res. 1970, supra 
note 235, ¶¶ 4-14. However neither of these measures is based on attribution of state 
responsibility for atrocity crimes. 
238.  Proposed Syria S.C. Resolution 348, supra note 3, pmbl. 
239.  S.C. Res. 1564, ¶ 12 (Sept. 18, 2004) (finding that that the ongoing violence in 
Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security); see also S.C. Res. 1556 (Jul. 30, 
2004). As impetus for Resolution 1564, the Security Council found that the ongoing violence 
in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Secretary-General gave 
the Commission three months to investigate and report its findings, requesting that it report 
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Security Council establish a State compensation commission for 
victims.240 The Commission determined that the duty to provide 
individual reparations, originating in human rights law had migrated 
to State responsibility for violations of humanitarian law, was now a 
customary obligation: 
[W]henever a gross breach of human rights is committed which 
also amounts to an international crime, customary international 
law not only provides for the criminal liability of the individuals 
who have committed that breach, but also imposes an obligation 
on States of which the perpetrators are nationals, or for which 
they acted as de jure or de facto organs, to make reparation 
(including compensation) for the damage made.241 
However, in its referral, the Security Council makes no mention 
of the Commission’s recommendation. The idea simply disappears. 
Although the Security Council acknowledges findings in both 
referrals that these States committed international crimes and so 
violated erga omnes obligations (obligations owed to the international 
community), it does not consider State responsibility for these acts. 
And without discussion of State responsibility there is no attention to 
any special forms that such breaches might entail—think of postwar 
Germany—like loss of territory, new elections, or reform of State 
institutions—or constitutional and legal reforms like security sector 
reform, separation of powers, and civilian control of the armed forced 
recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur on transitional justice—
to bring a fuller measure of justice to the countries and lay the 
groundwork for a sustainable peace. 
2. The Opportunity of Enforcing State Obligations to the International 
Community 
The Security Council referrals put into sharp relief the 
uncoordinated and insufficient international system of State legal 
accountability for atrocity crimes. While there is factual and some 
legal overlap, the mechanisms for enforcement of dual responsibility 
                                                                                                             
back to the Security Council by January 25, 2005. The final report focuses specifically on 
events that occurred between February 2003 and January 2005. See ICID Report, supra note 
235, at 2. 
240.  ICID Report, supra note 235, ¶ 601. 
241.  Id. ¶ 598 (emphasis added); see also Christine Byron, Comment on the Report of 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 5 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351, 359 (2005). 
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for atrocities are largely distinct.242 States established the ICC but 
have not been interested in creating a comparable supranational 
judicial mechanism to enforce erga omnes obligations.243 Powerful 
States are reluctant to subject their actions to international legal 
oversight. Judicial human rights mechanisms, serve to develop the 
law of State responsibility in the context of duties to victims but this 
system is not a substitute for an accountability system to enforce State 
responsibility for international crimes. Judicial enforcement of human 
rights obligations puts the burden on individuals to bring 
complaints,244 and while in theory human rights mechanisms could 
function to enforce robust measures of State responsibility for 
atrocities, they have not done so.245 The interstate human rights 
mechanisms rely on dialogue with States, and their decisions are non-
binding. While the human rights regime is doing important and 
effective work, it is not an international accountability system. 
In fact, international criminal courts and human rights 
mechanisms reflect liberal conceptualizations of international justice 
and may serve to obscure the lack of international legal accountability 
for violations of obligations to humanity. Justice Jackson’s opening 
statement at Nuremberg is oft-quoted for its eloquent argument for 
international criminal liability: “Of course, the idea that a state, any 
more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always 
are committed only by persons.”246 But the next sentence, a 
restatement of international law, is not valorized: “While it is quite 
proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or corporation 
for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable 
to let such a legalism become the basis of personal immunity.”247 
International justice and State accountability for gross human rights 
violations has come to apply the first sentence of the passage and 
                                                                                                             
242.  BEATRICE I. BONAFE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 28 (2009). 
243.  White, supra note 199, at 324-27. 
244.  Gerry Simpson attributes this development to the trend in international law after 
Nuremberg to recognize the individual. Simpson, supra note 201, at 75. “The move to 
individual responsibility, then, in international criminal law, modifies this tendency [of 
nonenforcement] and has been hailed as a way of giving human rights law the bite it was 
thought to lack.” Id. at 76. 
245.  Human rights mechanisms generally prefer compensatory remedies for victims of 
human rights violations and have not developed measures of mass compensation or guarantees 
of non-repetition that extend to large-scale institutional and structural reforms. 
246.  Opening Speech, supra note 26. 
247.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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ignore that Nuremberg was not intended to change the pre-existing 
international law of State liability. However, recognition of individual 
criminal liability has been misinterpreted to equate collective liability 
with collective guilt, and thus antithetical to the liberal premise of the 
new international legal order. And transitional justice has continued to 
carry this banner. 
State crimes are violations of duties owed to the international 
community, but the development of the relevant branches of 
international law has meant that the international community has not 
seen fit to establish a judicial enforcement mechanism.248 The results 
of States’ preference for addressing State crimes through the political 
organ of the Security Council can be seen in the ICC referrals. The 
Security Council, without any hint of irony, effectively insists on a 
fractured and partial application of international rule of law. On the 
one hand, the Council emphasizes the importance of enforcing 
individual criminal responsibility. On the other hand, it elides any 
discussion of State culpability for the commission of international 
crimes and appropriate measures to punish the offending States.249 
3. The Challenge to Enforcing State Obligations to the International 
Community 
What are some of effects of ignoring State legal accountability? 
From the perspective of international relations, it preserves political 
flexibility. The singular focus on legal accountability of individuals 
allows offending States, like Serbia, to sacrifice their (former) “bad” 
leaders to international criminal justice to gain benefits of interstate 
cooperation, like membership in the European Union. The “good” 
third-party States are seen to do justice by siphoning off the bad 
actors to international courts while they maintain or rehabilitate the 
offending State as a stable partner.250 And separate from the multi-
                                                                                                             
248. Systemic Effects of International Responsibility, supra note 2, at 336 (“The fact that, 
largely due to the jurisdictional limitations, neither the ICJ nor any other court was able to 
identify a collectivity that was responsible for the genocide illustrates the shortcomings of the 
law of international responsibility in dealing with such entities in system crimes and the need 
for rethinking of the connection between international law and system criminality.”). 
249.  The status quo also preserves political flexibility in how the international 
community chooses to respond, or not, to state crimes. As Nigel White argued: “Reference to 
the International Criminal Court is not putting justice first, it is using a mechanism of justice 
for not taking any action that would restore peace but also prevent further crimes from being 
committed.” White, supra note 199, at 323. 
250.   SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 6, at 11. 
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lateral benefits, powerful States are served by observing State 
sovereignty in these circumstances lest they set a precedent and find 
themselves subject to similar scrutiny. While international power will 
undoubtedly manifest in which States are selected for accountability, 
with weak States more likely to be subject to enforcement, this should 
be weighed against the rule of law values promoted by recognition of 
State responsibility. Not only does the current system deny legal 
enforcement of State obligations to remedy harms to victims and 
society more generally, it also creates the illusion of international 
criminal accountability as the full measure of justice the international 
community can and should deliver. Residents of States that have 
committed atrocity crimes against their own populations are the direct 
beneficiaries of remedies for State responsibility.251 The affected 
populations stand in urgent need of adequate legal protections, an 
independent judiciary, security forces that respect human rights, and 
measures to promote social justice—all of which fall within 
guarantees of non-repetition.252 While not to minimize the challenges 
to fair enforcement, these are second order problems. Currently, 
transitional justice is not talking about State legal accountability and 
its consequences. The legal obligations of States for failing to prevent 
atrocity crimes or for their direct involvement in their perpetration are 
not surfaced. The ICC becomes the measure of international 
punishment and state accountability is not a feature of this discussion. 
C. Changing the Politics of International Justice 
Transitional justice colludes in this submergence of State 
accountability. Within the field, the absolutist model of legal 
accountability is hegemonic: punishment of the State is rejected 
normatively as a form of collective punishment. Yet the aim of 
advocates making this claim was to support international criminal 
trials, not to argue against state liability. However, this framing 
together with the formal rejection of State crimes has served to efface 
State legal responsibility as an international response to mass 
violence. Versailles is flouted as the cautionary tale of collective 
guilt: Nuremberg its anodyne corrective. But what if we treated 
Versailles as merely a bad case of State responsibility, while the 
                                                                                                             
251.  de Greiff Report, supra note 22, ¶ 20(c). 
252.  Id. 
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Potsdam framework is understood as an example of a more measured 
and balanced application of remedies for dual responsibility? 
1. Transitional Justice’s Conception of Law and State Liability 
The calls within transitional justice for remedying the structures 
of State violence ignore the law of State responsibility and the 
purchase it offers. These voices come from the periphery of 
transitional justice, raising the need for social justice against the 
hegemony of legal (criminal law) and top-down solutions. The hybrid 
and grafted accountability models implicitly recognize the problem of 
system criminality and its legacy for social reconstruction but do not 
look to address these from the perspective of State legal 
accountability and do not seek the framework of state responsibility 
as a source of leverage. 
The transitional justice accountability models recognize State 
responsibility in two regards: (1) the State duty to prosecute and (2) 
the duty to provide reparations to victims. These underserve the field. 
The guarantees of non-repetition developed in human rights 
jurisprudence and at the ICJ pale in comparison to the muscularity 
that is needed. The more extreme State-focused measures the Allies 
imposed on Germany and Japan and the more ambitious initiatives of 
the Special Rapporteur on transitional justice provide more fertile 
examples of what legal remedies could be contemplated. 
When States target groups for bloody attack based on sectarian, 
ethnic, or racial divisions, it is reasonable to assume that striking 
down discriminatory laws that constituted State policy, creating bills 
of rights, and establishing constitutional courts to enforce these 
protections are prudent measures to dismantle offending State 
structures and to prevent recurrence of State violence. We can 
advance international rule of law by identifying these as legal 
obligations owed not just to victims but to the international 
community as a whole based on the role of the State in perpetrating 
atrocities. 
The Special Rapporteur’s policy approach to guarantees of non-
repetition is important, but transitional justice can and should go 
further to enlist international law in this regard. The Special 
Rapporteur’s is a soft law mandate.253 Transitional justice scholars 
                                                                                                             
253.  See Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/
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and advocates could seek to leverage the international law of State 
responsibility. By way of example, proponents could seek to harness 
the Chapter VII authority of the Security Council. The Security 
Council could adopt an approach to accountability for State-
sponsored atrocities that encompasses dual responsibility. In other 
words, the Security Council could, as appropriate, refer situations to 
the ICC and direct States to fulfill their legal obligations for State 
responsibility through providing compensation, undertaking 
constitutional reforms, etc. This begs the question of what would be 
required for transitional justice to make this intellectual shift and 
move from a politics of accountability understood only as criminal 
accountability to a politics of accountability that seeks to address both 
the individual leaders as well as the structural and collective 
dimensions of mass atrocity crimes? 
The elision of State accountability in transitional justice shapes 
the type of politics of accountability that are possible. Politics in this 
case refers to the character of the debate among competing ideas 
about what the international community should do to respond to mass 
violence. Currently, the politics of international accountability are 
framed by transitional justice, which in turn relies on legalism 
exclusively to justify individual international criminal accountability. 
The transitional justice conceptualizations of accountability contribute 
to a politics of liberalism insofar as transitional justice confines 
sanction to individuals and takes our eyes off of the role of State 
structures in perpetrating international crimes. 
This limited view of State legal accountability is also galvanized 
by the development of the modern international legal system that has 
seen the maturation of human rights norms and mechanisms relative 
to State responsibility. Robert Meister and Samuel Moyn each offer 
histories of the rise of human rights movements as bound up with the 
death of revolutions.254 Liberalism and human rights have triumphed 
over other emancipatory projects that focus on more radical 
redistributive and structural reform projects. Furthermore, human 
rights and its advocates strengthen international criminal law by 
                                                                                                             
Pages/Introduction.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, 
Special Rapporteurs as Law Makers: The Developments and Evolution of the Normative 
Framework for Protecting and Assisting Internally Displaced Persons, 15 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 
286 (2011). 
254.  ROBERT MEISTER, AFTER EVIL: THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (2011); 
SAMUEL MOYN: THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 170 (2010). 
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insisting on the State duty to prosecute. These two legal branches 
share their origins in the horrors of the Second World War, are 
intellectually consistent with one another, and practically mutually 
reinforcing. Individuals are the objects of attention in each, as rights-
bearers, and the aim of both areas is to ensure human flourishing 
through a normative regime. 
So configured, the Nuremberg/absolutist model of accountability 
and the aspects of the hybrid and grafted models that accept criminal 
prosecutions understand accountability as a liberal exercise, which 
works against seeing the need for collective liability to address State 
atrocities. Jackson’s call to pierce sovereign immunity to hold war 
criminals accountable extinguishes his caveat that the legal fiction of 
the State must remain for purposes of imposing collective liability. 
Hence the Nuremberg Principles reach their full expression with the 
International Criminal Court and the Draft Articles of State 
Responsibility artfully camouflage State crimes as violations of 
higher order norms, where they lay in wait for future expression. 
Transitional justice has colluded in the international preference for 
liberal justice by omitting State accountability from its discourse. This 
leaves the question of how to address State breaches of these norms to 
international political, rather than legal, processes. The result may 
serve sovereign States but certainly not the affected populations. And 
the persistence of State structures and institutions unrepentant, 
unchanged, and legally unchallenged after mass violence, threatens 
peace and security. 
What liberalism offers is fealty to rule of law values. This can be 
drawn upon to call for invigorating international processes to 
vindicate the collective interests of humanity through State 
accountability. State accountability and adherence to international law 
obligations is part of international rule of law. Identifying State 
transgressors as responsible for their involvement in international 
crimes and insisting on commensurate legal remedies advances rule 
of law values and offers a potentially potent legal tool to secure 
structural remedies that can promote sustainable peace. The 
conditions under which pursuit of State legal accountability is 
warranted deserve further study. The debates among realists versus 
idealists regarding whether pursuit of justice for war criminals would 
jeopardize peace, are similarly pertinent to the question of State 
responsibility. Without resolving those questions here, the point is 
that this is a discussion that transitional justice should welcome. 
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Without it, transitional justice colludes with the status quo in which 
state legal accountability for atrocity crimes is invisible. 
2. Overcoming Transitional Justice’s Elision of State Legal 
Accountability 
What would it mean for transitional justice to incorporate calls 
for State accountability? Current conceptual barriers need to be 
addressed, a sketch of which is offered here. For purposes of 
discussion, the Security Council is taken as an example of an existing 
international institution that could instigate State accountability.255 
First, transitional justice needs to incorporate the conceptual 
contribution of dual responsibility that international law offers. The 
State and the individual may both violate international norms in the 
commission of atrocities. Transitional justice should look past the 
philosophical objection of Jaspers to collective guilt and see that 
collective liability of the State rests comfortably with pursuit of 
individual criminal responsibility. All three transitional justice models 
of accountability adopt the inherited logic of Nuremberg that rejects 
collective legal guilt as illiberal and dangerous. This is a false trap. 
Proponents of international criminal law were happy to accept, if not 
advance, Jaspers’ critique in pursuit of enforcement of international 
criminal sanction of individuals. Yet individual sanction and State 
liability are two separate concepts and international law helps to see 
that promotion of one does not need to come at the expense of the 
other. This is the conceptual contribution that dual responsibility in 
international law offers to transitional justice. Transitional justice 
could understand the State entity as a governance structure (the legal 
sovereign) and not as the legal personality of “the people.” The 
principle that a State, like an individual, that breaches its international 
obligations is liable for the consequences of its actions is the basis of 
international law, as Justice Jackson understood. Embracing the legal 
fiction of the State as a collective entity does not displace individual 
criminal liability. Understanding the State as separate from the people 
legally and normatively would help to shed the false shackles of 
                                                                                                             
255.   International legal scholars have suggested that the UN Security Council can 
serve as a site for the functional equivalent of a legal mechanism dedicated to international 
enforcement of state responsibility for atrocities. Systemic Effects of International 
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 352. The question of whether the Security Council is the 
appropriate international mechanism is beyond the scope of this article. 
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collective guilt that have hampered recognition of State crimes as part 
of international justice discourse and practice. 
Next, State culpability needs to be intellectually authorized by 
transitional justice. Here, the full history of the international 
community’s flirtation with State crimes should be excavated to 
capitalize on international principles that recognize that State 
violation of obligations erga omnes has special consequences. The 
formal distinction between fault and wrongfulness in international law 
is slippery and borders on sophistry when it comes to atrocity crimes. 
The drafting history of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
shows how penal sanction at one point was uncontroversial. As the 
international commitment to a collective, humanitarian world order 
receded from its high-water mark in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War, the normative scope of State responsibility 
shrunk to exclude penal sanction. Yet the essential rule of law values 
that promote fair application of shared norms, apply equally to 
individuals and to States that perpetrate atrocity crimes. 
Transitional justice gains much of its legitimacy from advancing 
these normative justice claims. Given the scope and nature of State-
perpetrated mass violence, advancing State legal responsibility for 
such acts has the functional normative equivalent of acknowledging 
state conduct as wrongful and reprehensible. In other words, 
transitional justice need not argue for a positive international law of 
State crimes. To bring States to account for their mass bloodshed, it 
can simply promote existing State legal responsibility for acts that are 
also criminalized under international law. Unfortunately, transitional 
justice has absorbed the rationale of the Nuremberg trials and ignored 
the precedential value of the imposition of structural reforms on 
criminal States offered by the examples of the Potsdam Protocol and 
Agreement.256 
Transitional justice has expanded to include demands that States 
adopt holistic approaches to repair the structural drivers of mass 
violence like discrimination, structural poverty, and lack of rights 
protection. State responsibility offers a way to identify and 
acknowledge these demands as legal justice remedies, rather than as 
                                                                                                             
256.  This phenomenon is illustrated by the recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on transitional justice, in which the human rights remedies for mass violations are offered as 
examples for transitional justice policy and the measures adopted for Germany and Japan are 
not mentioned. 
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policy options.257 This will be aided if the field embraces the full 
historic record of the international response to the crimes of Germany 
and Japan, which included legal, political, and economic reform 
alongside criminal accountability. Doing so would allow transitional 
justice to reconceptualize accountability as consisting of two aspects 
existing in a horizontal relationship: individual and State 
responsibility. Each aspect attends to different dimensions of justice 
after mass violence. 
Finally, transitional justice needs to reconcile itself to legalism. 
Currently, international criminal law diverts the gaze of transitional 
justice from the laws, institutions, and state practices that give rise to, 
sustain, and may endure after States commit international crimes. 
International criminal justice may be politically expedient but it does 
not substitute for other measures of justice—striking down 
discriminatory laws, particularly those that generate economic and 
social exclusion that drive violence; establishing constitutional 
guarantees of individual rights and mechanisms for their enforcement; 
conducting institutional reform of police and armed forces, etc.—that 
may be required to repair the harm inflicted by State violence and to 
ensure peace. The international law on State responsibility and human 
rights offer legal norms that legally bind the State in service of these 
justice aims. 
Calling for enforcement of legal obligations of the State that 
could address system criminality will not constitute all that societies 
may need to do ensure a sustainable peace. But currently, transitional 
justice is not making full use of the legal tools available. The hybrid 
and grafted transitional justice accountability models recognize the 
lacuna of redress for system criminality but implicitly or explicitly 
address this by deprioritizing not just criminal justice but legalism as 
the metric for accountability. Seeing the value in pursuing State 
accountability would awaken transitional justice to the lost 
opportunity of the Sudan Commission of Inquiry. Its recommendation 
for victim compensation and a truth commission is an example of 
what State accountability for international crimes can look like. 
Guarantees of non-repetition could also be crafted to address root 
causes of the conflict. For example, in the case of Darfur these lie in 
                                                                                                             
257.  de Greiff Report, supra note 22; discussion supra Part II. 
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disputes about local governance and land, which result in economic 
and social marginalization of residents in the region.258 
To be sure, the hybrid and transformative models of transitional 
justice accountability bring needed attention to grounded and bottom-
up perspectives on what measures are needed to repair society. But 
the State, as a unit of analysis, is a vital component to eradicating the 
“root and branch” problems that transformative justice in particular 
seeks to accomplish. The structural reforms like new constitutions, 
institutional reform, local control, and reparations to victims—the 
kinds of root and branch problems that transformative transitional 
justice wants to fix—fit within what the UN advocates for transitional 
justice policy. These initiatives would be more legally potent if 
advanced as remedies of State responsibility. 
In addition to these practical effects, the absence of a discourse 
about State wrongdoing submerges the fact that current approaches 
enable State impunity for atrocities. States are charged with 
guaranteeing the welfare of their residents. When States violate this 
basic compact by directing the institutions of the State to commit 
mass violence, State culpability should be acknowledged and legal 
consequences imposed. International law uniquely is able to convey 
the necessary and appropriate opprobrium for behavior that offends 
global values. 
In order for transitional justice to incorporate this perspective, 
the transitional justice critics of legalism would need to accept that 
law is not the enemy of the changes they seek to promote. In fact 
international law theoretically is capable of delivering much of their 
demands. To be sure, the law of State responsibility is not a magic 
bullet. The arrested development of the Draft Articles and State 
practice in imposing special measures against States that commit 
international crimes point to the latent state of international legal 
accountability of States. The problem is that the preoccupation of 
transitional justice with individual criminal accountability prevents 
the field from seeing how this debate occupies its legal imagination. 
The inability to see how the focus on international criminal 
accountability distracts attention from state accountability may be the 
biggest threat we face to adopting an adequate and holistic response 
to international atrocity crimes. 
                                                                                                             
258.  ICID Report, supra note 235, ¶¶ 61-62. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is a dilemma for international law that State authorities carry 
out international crimes through the instrumentality of State systems. 
The development of the international legal order after the Allies’ 
defeat of Germany and Japan has favored individual criminal 
responsibility as its highest form of sanction. Transitional justice as 
the current body of thought and practice regarding how the 
international community should respond when States are responsible 
for the commission of mass atrocities adopts this thinking and ignores 
that States may also be legally responsible for such acts. This 
approach reflects a misguided repudiation of collective guilt that the 
Nuremberg trials have come to symbolize. It overlooks that State 
liability is a bedrock principle for State violations of international 
law. It also ignores the remedies for State liabilities the Allies 
imposed on Germany and Japan to refashion the defeated States, 
which included extensive corrective structural measures. Thus 
transitional justice inherits and remembers a fragmented history. 
This partial incorporation of history is reflected in how the field 
conceptualizes legal accountability. A fuller review of the 
development of the postwar international legal system reminds us that 
State crimes were an uncontroversial proposition in the early decades 
of the UN system. International law relevant to addressing mass 
atrocities has developed into disparate branches, with international 
criminal law assuming the lead. This Article has argued that 
transitional justice has incorporated individual criminal responsibility 
as its primary conception of what constitutes international legal 
accountability for atrocities. Transitional justice has three competing 
models of accountability and none of them recognizes the importance 
of State legal accountability. As a result, transitional justice fails to 
capitalize on the rule of law values that undergird the international 
system to press for more robust measures against States that have 
committed international crimes. The failure of transitional justice to 
call out offending States does damage. It cloaks mass suffering in a 
false veil of sovereignty. It enables an international system in which 
criminal states are able to maintain compromised governance systems 
by offering up individuals to criminal prosecution. And powerful 
States shield themselves from scrutiny for any role they may play in 
being complicit with perpetrator States. 
Currently, individual criminal accountability occupies the center 
of the politics of transitional justice. To change the status quo to 
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enable State accountability to assume equal prioritization and harness 
its legal potential to redress State structures and promote sustainable 
peace, transitional justice needs to reconsider its relationship to law 
and to legal accountability. Doing so is risky. It will be important that 
the recognition of State accountability does not mean that the field 
loses sight of the limits of law or the perspective of communities and 
individuals on transitional justice responses. Yet the failure to respond 
is even greater. The capacity of states to inflict mass suffering appears 
nearly unlimited. The international community can develop greater 
tools to redress such abuses. To see that international criminal justice 
is not the full measure of legal justice does not denigrate its 
contribution. It helps us to see that States enjoy impunity for 
international crimes, and invites us to redouble our efforts to ensure 
accountability for both the State and individual dimensions of 
international atrocity crimes. 
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